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NOTES
Safeguarding the Litigant's Constitutional Right to a Fair and
Impartial Forum: A Due Process Approach to Improprieties
Arising from Judicial Campaign Contributions from
Lawyers
The various methods by which the states currently select their
judges fall into five general categories: executive appointment, legislative selection, partisan election, nonpartisan election, and "merit" selection, which involves selection by a committee professing special
competence to select judges. 1 Within these five categories, states differ
as to many particulars, such as the term of office and the method of
renomination, so that no two systems are exactly alike. 2 However,
forty-three states currently use methods requiring at least some judges
to stand for election in order to win or retain office. 3 The nature of the
elections varies from state to state;4 but no matter which selection
method a state employs, the judges in all forty-three of these states
must at some point raise campaign funds. 5
The obvious place for judges to seek those campaign funds is the
local bar, 6 since attorneys are likely to be more familiar than the genI. The broad outlines of each type of system are discussed in Judicial Selection: What Fits
Texas? A National Symposium on Judicial Selection and Tenure, 40 Sw. L.J. I, 1-52 (1986).

2. The details of the various state selection processes are set forth in L. BERKSON, S. BELLER
& M. GRIMALDI, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES: A COMPENDIUM OF PROVI·
SIONS 1-46 (1980).
3. The exceptions are Delaware, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island,
Vermont, and Virginia. Id. Thirty-nine of those states elect the judges on the highest appellate
court in the state, with Connecticut, Maine, New Jersey, and New York being the additional
exceptions. Id.
The degree of conformity among American jurisdictions on this point is truly astounding.
Outside of the United States the only places in the world where judges are elected arc the Soviet
Union, its satellites, and to a limited extent Switzerland. Kauffman, Judicial Selection ill Pe1111·
sylva11ia: A Proposal, 21 VILL. L. REV. 1163, 1164 n.6 (1982).
4. Elections are generally partisan or nonpartisan races in which multiple candidates may vie
for judicial office, or "retention" elections in which the incumbent judge is unopposed and the
issue is simply whether he should remain in office. L. BERKSON, S. BELLER & M. GRIMALDI,
supra note 2, at 1-46.
5. Moreover, the need for fundraising has increased markedly in the last decade. Dubois,
Financing Trial Court Elections: Who Contributes to California Judicial Campaigns?, 70 JUDICATURE 8, 9 (1986). The author attributes the increased cost of judicial election campaigns to
increases in both the number of candidates for judicial office and the amount spent by each.
6. Indeed, lawyers constitute the largest single group of contributors to judicial campaigns.
DuBois, supra note 5, found that in the contested 1980 California Superior Court elections, lawyers and Jaw firms donated 39.2% of the money spent in the primaries and 32.4% of the money
spent in runoff elections. Id. at 12. In Circuit Court general elections in Cook County, Illinois,
other researchers found that more than half of all outside contributions came from lawyers and
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eral public with the candidates and the demands of the office. 7 However, reliance on attorney contributions raises a disturbing question
about the even-handedness of justice when one of a judge's major contributors8 later argues a case before that judge: Is the contributor's
opponent being deprived of his constitutional right to a fair and impartial forum?
Traditionally, the states and the legal profession have viewed the
problem of attorney contributions as one of professional ethics. 9 The
American Bar Association's Code of Judicial Conduct10 (CJC) defines
the ethical bounds of judicial campaign conduct in Canon 7(B), 11
law firms. Nicholson & Weiss, Funding Judicial Campaigns in the Circuit Court of Cook County,
70 JUDICATURE 17, 21-22 (1986).
7. See c. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 11.3.2, at 601 (1986).
8. There is no obvious reason why pecuniary support should be more likely to influence a
judge than some forms of nonpecuniary support, such as serving as a campaign manager or party
leader. This Note is therefore concerned with all aspects of political support during judicial
campaigns, and terms like "political contributors" will be used throughout the Note to include
all political supporters, unless otherwise noted.
Somewhat more troubling is the case of conspicuous noncontributors. It would be absurd to
argue for a due process right to have one's case heard only by a judge to whom one has contributed time or money. However, there may be cases where noncontributors' due process rights are
jeopardized, such as where a perennial supporter withdraws support and refuses to contribute
after overt solicitation, or where an attorney has been intimately involved in the opposition's
campaign. This latter category would obviously include those cases where one of the attorneys
was the losing candidate, especially in hotly contested races. While such cases may arise infrequently, the due process analysis set out in Part II of this Note should also apply when conspicuous noncontribution endangers a litigant's right to a fair and impartial forum.
Although this Note deals with all aspects of political support, it is concerned only with political support and does not rely on any assumptions about corruption in the state judiciary. On the
contrary, actual bribery is completely irrelevant to this Note, since each state already prohibits
that sort of misconduct. This Note deals only with the constitutional ramifications of campaign
conduct which is perfectly legal and for which an adversely affected litigant currently has no
other recourse.
9. Self-regulation is the primary form of' regulation of the legal profession. See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 7, § 2.1, at 20-22.
10. Currently, the American Bar Association's Code of Judicial Conduct has been enacted in
substantial part in forty-seven jurisdictions, including the federal system and the District of Columbia. Illinois, Maryland, Montana, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin have each adopted separate
standards of judicial conduct. Goldstein, Fundraising by Judges: Ethical Restrictions on Assisting Civic, Charitable and Other Organizations, 70 JUDICATURE 27, 27 n.l (1986).
11. Canon 7(B) states:
B. Campaign Conduct.
(1) A candidate, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial office that is filled either by
public election between competing candidates or on the basis of a merit system election:
(a) should maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial office, and should encourage
members of his family to adhere to the same standards of political conduct that apply to
him·
Cb) should prohibit public officials or employees subject to his direction or control from
doing for him what he is prohibited from doing under this Canon; and except to the extent
authorized under subsection B(2) or B(3), he should not allow any other person to do for
him what he is prohibited from doing under this Canon;
(c) should not make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and
impartial performance of the duties of the office; announce his views on disputed legal or
political issues; or misrepresent his identity, qualifications, present position, or other fact.
(2) A candidate, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial office that is filled by public
election between competing candidates should not himself solicit or accept campaign funds,

384

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 86:382

which takes the general approach of attempting to prevent candidates
from learning the identities of their contributors. 12 The CJC also suggests that "[a] judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which
his impartiality might reasonably be questioned," including instances
where "he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party," or
where he knows that he or a close relative is financially interested in
the litigation or a party to it. 13 Moreover, the American Bar Association's Model Code of Professional Responsibility 14 and Model Rules
of Professional Conduct 15 prohibit lawyers from making gifts or loans
to judges unless allowable under the CJC.16
However, state attempts to police judicial campaigns through rules
of professional ethics have been unsuccessful. 17 One problem is that
enforcement of the CJC has been hampered by the fact that the judicial conduct commissions vested with the authority to enforce the ethical provisions against judges often have no authority over losing
candidates. 18 However, a more fundamental problem is that the genor solicit publicly stated support, but he may establish committees of responsible persons to
secure and manage the expenditure of funds for his campaign and to obtain public statements of support for his candidacy. Such committees are not prohibited from soliciting
campaign contributions and public support from lawyers. A candidate's committees may
solicit funds for his campaign no earlier than [90] days before a primary election and no
later than [90] days after the last election in which he participates during the election year.
A candidate should not use or permit the use of campaign contributions for the private
benefit of himself or members of his family.
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B) (1972) (emphasis added) (the bracketed portions arc
to be modified as appropriate in each state).
12. See CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(2) (1972), quoted in note 11 supra. The
inadequacy of anonymity as a general approach to questions of improper influence is discussed
briefly in the text accompanying notes 19-21 infra.
13. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(C)(l) (1972) (emphasis added).
14. The ABA promulgated the Model Code of Professional Responsibility in 1969. Since
then nearly every jurisdiction has adopted the Code in some way, and in most states the Code has
the force of law and is thus binding on all lawyers rather than ABA members only. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 7, § 2.6.3, at 56-57.
15. The ABA promulgated the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in 1983 to respond to
criticism of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Id. § 2.6.4, at 60. Though still young, the
Model Rules do not promise to have nearly the influence that the earlier Code did. Id. § 2.6.4, at
62-63.
16. Disciplinary Rule 7-1 lO(A) provides:
A lawyer shall not give or lend any thing of value to a judge, official, or employee of a
tribunal, except as permitted by Section C(4) of Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
but a lawyer may make a contribution to the campaign fund of a candidate for judicial office
in conformity with Section B(2) under Canon 7 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-llO(A) (1980). See also MODE!.
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(f) (1983) (prohibiting lawyers from "knowingly
assist[ing] a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable rules of judicial
conduct or other law").
17. For a thorough examination of this problem, canvassing state adoption, modification,
and enforcement of Canon 7(B), see generally Survey, The Ethical Dilemma of Campaig11i11g for
Judicial Office: A Proposed Solution, 14 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 353 (1986) [hereinafter Ethical

Dilemma].
18. See Schotland, Elective Judges' Campaign Financing: Are State Judges' Robes the Emperor's Clothes ofAmerican Democracy?, 2 J.L. & POL. 57, 91-93 (1985); Ethical Dilemma, supra
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eral approach taken by the CJC - forced contributor anonymity accompanied by discretionary disqualification
is hopelessly
inadequate. The commentary to CJC Canon 7(B) states that "[u]nless
the candidate is required by law to file a list of his campaign contributors, their names should not be revealed to the candidate." 19 However, only ten states included this commentary in their enactments of
the CJC, and all fifty states currently require disclosure of all contributions and the names of those who contribute more than a minimum
amount. 2 Contributor anonymity is thus nearly impossible to enforce. Furthermore, even with perfect enforcement of the CJC's policy of contributor anonymity, judges will still know the identities of
many of their supporters merely by looking around at fundraisers and
other functions which are legitimate under the Canons. 21
This failure of the states to police judicial elections adequately is
no mere problem of judicial ethics. It also raises constitutional concerns to the extent that past campaign contributions by one of the
attorneys22 in a case may deprive the opposing party of his right,

°

note 17, at 384. This is so in spite of the fact that Canon 7(B) applies by its own terms to
"candidates," rather than merely judges, and in spite of the fact that Disciplinary Rule 8-103 of
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility expressly makes Canon 7 applicable to lawyercandidates for judicial office. Losing candidates are generally still members of the bar, of course,
but Professor Schotland suggests an unwillingness among state bar associations to punish colleagues for campaign violations. The fact that incumbent judges are much more likely to be
punished for questionable campaign activity than their challengers led California to suspend Canon 7(B) altogether. Schotland, supra, at 91.
Professor Schotland also points to the problem of devising effective sanctions for ethical violations when the stakes are so high. Id. at 92-93. Apart from steps like impeachment that would
reverse the election result, see, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 20, § 1404.l (1981), it would be difficult to
deter even successful candidates from pursuing a "win at all costs" strategy if the moral force of
the ethical considerations is not enough.
19. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B) commentary (1972).
20. Ethical Dilemma, supra note 17, at 374. The amount varies from zero (in Maryland,
New Mexico, Ohio, and Wyoming) to $2,000 (in Louisiana). Id. at 374 n.140.
21. See note 8 supra.
22. In any particular case, the probability of unconstitutional bias is perhaps independent of
whether the contribution in question came from a party's attorney or from the party himself.
Hence, many of the arguments of Part II, that judges may be unconstitutionally biased by attorney contributions, might seem also to apply to contributions made by parties. However, this
Note considers only attorney contributions, for two reasons.
First, in the absence of pending litigation, few nonlawyers can be thought to contribute to
judges specifically in order to curry favor, for the simple reason that few nonlawyers are in court
often enough to be able to say with any confidence that they will ever appear before a particular
judge. (The appropriate exceptions are discussed in note 85 infra.) This means not only that the
problem is less serious in statistical terms, but also that the judge has little reason to believe that
the litigant's support depends upon the judge's verdict, and accordingly less reason to tip the
scales in favor of the contributor.
Second, a different remedy may be indicated when it is a party rather than an attorney who
contributes. Part III.A argues that the sheer volume of lawyer contributions, see note 6 supra,
makes judicial recusal an unsatisfactory remedy. Because the discussion of these difficult remedial questions does not apply to situations that occur less frequently, the problem of nonlawyer
contributions has been omitted entirely.
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under the due process clause, 23 to a fair and impartial forum. 24 From
this constitutional perspective, a judge's technical compliance with the
ere or other state regulatory statutes25 is irrelevant. Instead, the inquiry is simply whether the forum is a fair one. If not, then settled due
process doctrine requires that the litigant have the opportunity to be
heard in a forum which is fair. 26
This Note will argue that the improprieties arising from some campaign contributions are so egregious that they offend the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Consequently, states must either
reform judicial campaigns to eliminate such improprieties, or, through
mandatory judicial recusal or disqualification, 27 respect the absolute
constitutional right to an impartial forum. Part I of this Note will
23. " ... nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of Jaw .... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
24. The Supreme Court has said of this right, "A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic require·
ment of due process.... To this end no man can be a judge in his own case and no man is
permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome." In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133,
136 (1955).
25. In addition to the requirements of the CJC which apply in most states, see note 10 supra,
most states have statutes or constitutional provisions respecting disqualification of judges. See
ALA. CONST. amend. 328, § 6.19; ALA. CooE § 12-1-12 (1986); ALASKA STAT. §§ 22.20.020,
22.20.022, 22.30.070 (1982); ARIZ. CONST. art. VI.I, §§ 2, 4; ARK. CONST. art. 7, § 20; CAL.
CONST. art. VI, §§ 17, 18; CAL. C1v. PROC. CoDE §§ 170 through 170.7 (West 1982); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 16-6-201 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-39 (1983); FLA. STAT. §§ 38.01-.03,
38.10 (1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-1-8 (1985); HAW. REV. STAT. § 601·7 (1985); IDAHO
CONST. art. I, § 18; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. llOA, para. 67, 68 (1985 & Supp. 1986); IND. CODE
§ 33-2.1-8·2 (1976); IOWA CODE§ 605.17 (1983); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 20-311 (1981); LA. CODE
C1v. PROC. ANN. art. 151-61(West1981 & Supp. 1987); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 67179 (West 1981); ME. CONST. art. IX, § 2; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1103 (Supp. 1987);
Mo. CONST. art. IV,§ 7; MINN. STAT.§§ 487.40, 542.13, 542.16 (1982); Miss. CONST. art. VI,
§ 165; Miss. CODE ANN.§ 11-1-11 (1972); Mo. REV. STAT.§§ 476.180, 508.090 (1986); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 3-1-802 (1986); NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-315 (1985); N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 35th;
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:l5-49 (West 1952); N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 18; N.Y. Juo. LAW § 14
(McKinney 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-83(3), 15A-1223 (1983 & Supp. 1985); N.D. CONST.
art. VI, § 11; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2937.20 (Anderson 1987); OKLA. STAT. tit. 20, §§ 140104.1 (1981 & Supp. 1986); OR. REV. STAT.§§ 14.110, 14.210, 14.250 (1985); s.c. CONST. art. V,
§ 15; s.c. CODE ANN. §§ 14-1-130, 14-3-50 (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§§ 15-12-2 through .37 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 17-2-101 (1980); TEX. CONST. art. v, §§ 11,
16; TEX. REV. C1v. STAT. ANN. art. 15 (Vernon 1969); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
30.01 (Vernon 1966); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-7-1 (1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 61 (Supp.
1987); VA. CODE ANN.§ 17·7 (1982); WASH. REV. CODE§ 4.12.030(4) (1985); W. VA. CODE
§ 51-2-8 (1981); WIS. STAT. § 757.19 (1983-1984).
26. See notes 81-119 infra and accompanying text.
27. Technically, there is a distinction between recusal and disqualification. Disqualification
involves the removal of jurisdiction by force of Jaw; thus it is grounds for collateral attack, is not
subject to the judge's discretion, and is generally not waivable. In contrast, recusal involves only
considerations of propriety. This once meaningful distinction is far less important today. Frank,
Disqualification of Judges: Jn Support of the Bayh Bill, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 43, 45 &
n. 7 (1970) (asserting that changes in the federal disqualification statute have made the term
recusal "largely obsolete"). But see Kilgarlin & Bruch, Disqualificatio11 and Recusal of Judges,
17 ST. MARY'S L.J. 599 (1986) (describing the distinction as it still exists in Texas). The distinc·
tion is not important in the context of this Note, since due process is offended by the fact that the
judge is sitting in the case, not by the subordinate rule of Jaw which the judge may or may not
have violated in doing so. This Note thus follows Frank and uses the terms interchangeably.
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examine the history of disqualification at common law and in American practice, focusing on the extent to which it has been held to be a
requirement of due process. Part II will argue that under the applicable due process standards, a litigant may successfully move to disqualify a judge who has accepted substantial political contributions from
the opposing party or counsel. Part III will discuss the inadequacy of
judicial recusal - the usual remedy for a denial of an impartial forum
- as a remedy in the context of judicial campaign contributions from
lawyers. Part III will also suggest that preventing improper influence,
by severely limiting lawyers' contributions to judicial candidates, is the
best way for states with elected judiciaries to ensure the impartiality of
their judges.
I.

THE RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL FORUM

A state normally possesses the power to regulate the administration of justice within its jurisdiction, subject only to the commands of
the United States Constitution. 28 The particular command embodied
in the fourteenth amendment, that no person be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, is violated only when
state action "offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." 2 9
A survey of the evolution of the idea of impartiality from its commonlaw origins to its present-day constitutional status illustrates just how
fundamental the notion of impartiality has been in Anglo-American
jurisprudence.
A.

The Evolution of the Law of Disqualification

At common law, the only recognized ground for disqualification
was pecuniary interest. 30 This rule was merely a specific application of
the broad principle that no man should be a judge in his own cause, 31
applied in 1608 by Sir Edward Coke in Bonham's Case. 32 Thomas
Bonham was a doctor who was denied a license to practice "physic"
by several other doctors designated by the King as "censors." When
Bonham continued to practice, he was fined; and when he refused to
pay the fine directly to the censors, they imprisoned him. Lord Coke
rendered judgment for Bonham in his suit for false imprisonment,
holding that "[t]he censors cannot be judges, ministers, and parties;
judges to give sentence or judgment; ministers to make summons; and
28. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977).
29. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 106 S. Ct. 1580, 1585 (1986) (quoting Patterson v. New
York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977)).
30. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605, 609 (1947).
31. "It is against reason, that if wrong be done any man, that he thereof should be his own
judge." I E. COKE, INSTITUTES *141a.
32. 8 Coke 107a, 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (K.B. 1608).
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parties to have the moiety of the forfeiture .... " 33 Lord Coke thought
this principle so fundamental that it controlled even the Act of Parliament and patent of King Henry VIII which authorized the state of
affairs in Bonham's Case. 34
Common-law judges were apparently willing to apply the concept
of "interest" very broadly. For instance, the court in the Case of
Foxham and Tithing 35 quashed an order affecting the office of the surveyor of the highways because the current surveyor was also a justice
of the peace whose name appeared in the caption of the order. And
the court in Between the Parishes of Great Charte and Kennington 36
quashed an order removing a pauper from one of the parishes because
one of the justices of the peace issuing the order was an inhabitant of
the parish whose taxes would be affected by the decision. 37
As strict as the early English judges were about disqualification for
interest, it is somewhat surprising that they thought neither general
bias38 nor relationship to a party sufficient for disqualification. 39 The
33. 8 Coke at 118a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 652.
34. 8 Coke at 118a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 652. The letters patent, which Coke quoted in Latin,
quite clearly authorize the President and Censors of the College of London to act as censors over
all who practiced within seven miles of the city of London. Furthermore, the King had directed
that any fines imposed by the censors were to be evenly divided between the censors and the
King. The King also specifically approved imprisonment as a method of compelling payment.
Parliament later ratified these concessions of the King. See 8 Coke at l 14a-b, 77 Eng. Rep. at
647-48. I am indebted to the Reverend Eric McDermott, S.J., and the Reverend J.P.M. Walsh,
S.J., both of Georgetown University, for translating the Latin quoted by Coke. See also
Plucknett, Bonham's Case and Judicial Review, 40 HARV. L. REV. 30, 32 (1926).
35. 2 Salkend 607, 91 Eng. Rep. 514 (K.B. 1705).
36. 2 Strange 1173, 93 Eng. Rep. 1107 (K.B. 1726).
37. 2 Strange at 1173, 93 Eng. Rep. at 1107-08. This strict common-law rule is generally
rejected today. Frank, supra note 30, at 614. It has been reversed by statute in some jurisdictions. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-39 (1983); LA. CODE C!V. PROC. ANN. art. 151(B) (West
Supp. 1987); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 671 (West 1981); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 220, § 10
(1986); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2A:15-49 (1986); N.Y. JUD. LAW§ 15 (McKinney 1983); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 61 (Supp. 1987); W. VA. CODE§ 51-3-6 (1981).
The court in Great Charte and Kennington intimated that the justices might be allowed to sit
in such a case if all the justices in a particular town would be similarly disqualified. 2 Strange at
1173, 93 Eng. Rep. at 1108. Parliament later responded to this suggestion by providing that
justices of the peace were not disqualified simply because they pay taxes. This is apparently the
beginning of what is now known as the "Rule of Necessity." Frank, supra note 30, at 61 I.
Under the Rule of Necessity a judge, even though disqualified from hearing a particular case,
may nonetheless hear the case if no determination could otherwise be had. For a recent applica·
tion of the Rule of Necessity, sec United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980). The Rule of Necessity is discussed further in the text accompanying notes 148-61 infra.
38. See Frank, supra note 30, at 618-19. In common parlance, the word "bias" would in·
clude concepts like financial interest and nepotistic tendencies. However, as used in discu~sions
of disqualification, "bias" refers to "less tangible prejudices for or against a party, a lawyer, or a
cause." Id. at 619. "Bias" is thus a term of art which excludes these more particular concepts by
definition. As an original matter, this taxonomy would have little to commend it, but the crca·
tion of a new one at this point has even less. Therefore, "bias" is used throughout this Note as
shorthand for the wide variety of personal antipathies (not arising from pecuniary interest) that
might underlie "a tendency or inclination to treat a particular litigant more or less generously
than a different litigant raising the identical legal issue." Rehnquist, Sense and Nonsense About
Judicial Ethics, 28 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 694, 709 (1973) (calling this concept "favoritism"),
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reason that Blackstone gave was that
the law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favor in a judge, who is
already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority
greatly depends upon that presumption and idea. And should the fact at
any time prove flagrantly such, as the delicacy of the law will not presume beforehand, there is no doubt but that such misbehavior would
draw down a heavy censure from those to whom the judge is accountable
for his conduct. 40

Early American courts differed with Blackstone on at least two
points. First, Americans placed less reliance on the judge's own desire
to avoid the "heavy censure" of which Blackstone spoke, choosing instead to make disqualification mandatory in certain types of situations. 41 Second, jurists on this side of the Atlantic realized that the
impartiality of the forum might be compromised for reasons other
than pecuniary interest. Accordingly, they came to focus on the simple question of whether the forum was impartial with less regard for
the particular reason why impartiality might be lacking. 4~ Soon state
courts and legislatures required disqualification for relationship to parties or attorneys, and for a number of types of bias.43 At the same
time, the principle of pecuniary interest was extended by analogy to
other types of interest created by changing economic institutions,44
such as the rise of the corporate form. 45
In addition to these departures from the Blackstonian rule, American expansion of disqualification rested on a new interpretation of
Blackstone's principle that the presumption of impartiality was the
linchpin of judicial authority and legitimacy. 46 To Blackstone, this
meant that judicial impartiality was too important an assumption to be
doubted, except perhaps in cases of the most egregious violations of
the assumption. 47 However, American jurists reached the opposite
conclusion: that judges must exercise the utmost care to avoid any
39. Frank, supra note 30, at 611-12. Relationship is "the problem posed where a judge participates in a case involving his relative." Id. at 611. Apparently jurors could be disqualified for
relationship even though judges could not. Id.
40. 3 W. BLACKSfONE, COMMENTARIES *361.
41. Note, Disqualification of Judges Because of Bias and Prejudice, 51 YALE L.J. 169, 169
(1941).
42. "Despite Blackstone's denial that bias could exist as a ground for disqualification a more
recent humility has prompted recognition that human judges may deny justice not only for profit
or to benefit a kinsman, but for less tangible prejudices for or against a party, a lawyer, or a
cause." Frank, supra note 30, at 619.
43. Id. at 612.
44. Id.
45. For instance, judges were disqualified for owning stock in a party-corporation, or for
being an officer of the corporation, or even for being the executor of an estate with stock in the
corporation. Id. at 613-14.
46. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
47. Id.
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public suspicion of impropriety, so as not to diminish public respect
for the judiciary. As the Supreme Court stated in In re Murchison,
Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases.
But our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the
probability of unfairness.... Such a stringent rule may sometimes bar
trial by judges who have no actual bias and who would do their very best
to weigh the scales of justice equally between contending parties. But to
perform its high function in the best way "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice."48

Hence, in order to preserve its legitimacy, our judicial system admonishes bench and bar alike to avoid even the appearance of
impropriety.4 9
48. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11,
14 (1954)). This language has been quoted recently with approval in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Lavoie, 106 S. Ct. 1580, 1587 (1986).
However, note the ambiguity in the quotation between appearance in the probabilistic sense
("probability of unfairness") and appearance in the truly cosmetic sense ("appearance of justice"). For one highly placed commentator's argument that our system has exaggerated the
cosmetic aspect in situations where "no reasonable person .•. could fairly conclude that the
judge's vote might even be subconsciously influenced," see Rehnquist, supra note 38, at 696-702.
In this article (then-) Justice Rehnquist stresses that, absent special circumstances, it is a judge's
duty to hear the cases before him - a duty that should not be lightly cast aside:
I do not think our profession will be well served by the creation of a climate of professional
opinion in which the kudos invariably go to the judge who is quickest to disqualify himself,
for such a climate could easily bring about a situation in which, to use Judge Hand's words,
only "the most resolute or the most irresponsible" judges would sit in cases in which they
ought to sit.
Id. at 713. Although these remarks were made in reference to disqualification generally, with no
special emphasis on the constitutional standards, they would seem to apply a fortiori to the constitutional limitations which the court has found in the due process clause, see Part I.B i11fra.
Hence, unless the current Chief Justice has changed his mind on this matter, at least one member
of the Supreme Court can be counted upon to ignore mere appearances of impropriety if they arc
unaccompanied by reasonable probabilities of actual favoritism. The constitutional importance
of appearance to the other Justices is not clear, but Chief Justice Rehnquist appears to espouse
the orthodox view, see note 49 infra.
49. See CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (1972); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1981). The importance of the "appearance of impropriety" rationale
in the realm of constitutional standards is far less clear than its importance at common law. On
the one hand, the Supreme Court has often referred to the appearance of a particular arrangement when it strikes it down for some other reason. See, e.g., Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 501
(1974) (reversing contempt conviction for lack of notice, inadequate opportunity to be heard, and
likelihood that judge would be biased by the contemnor's courtroom antics) ("inquiry must be
not only whether there was actual bias on [the judge's] part, but also whether there was 'such a
likelihood of bias or an appeara11ce of bias that the judge was unable to hold the balance between
vindicating the interests of the court and the interests of the accused' " (emphasis added)); text
accompanying note 48 supra. On the other hand, it is difficult to read any case as holding a
judge's participation unconstitutional solely because it might look improper.
The actual probability of unfairness was emphasized in Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35
(1975) (upholding a medical discipline panel against a charge of unconstitutional bias). There
Justice White stated for a unanimous Court that a charge of bias would succeed only if, "under a
realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness, [the challenged practice]
poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented." 421 U.S. at 47 (emphasis added). As
Withrow v. Larki11 illustrates, the Court seems much more concerned with probabilities than with
appearances, and the "appearance of impropriety" language seems to be mere icing on the
"probability of unfairness" cake. But see Note, Justice Without Favor: Due Process a11d Separa-
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The Constitutional Law of Disqualification

The constitutional standards of disqualification have developed in
many of the same factual settings as the common-law and statutory
standards.so However, not all of the common-law grounds for disqualification are of constitutional magnitude.st In general, the situations in which disqualification is constitutionally required are the most
shocking variations on the common-law themes, leading one authority
to characterize the constitutional safeguards as "the inner core of disqualification. "s2 The Supreme Court has often borrowed common-law
terms such as "interest" or "bias" as shorthand for the factual situations in constitutional "impartial forum" adjudication, but the substance of the constitutional disqualification decisions generally follows
the American trend toward generalization in this area. s3 Hence, the
"impartial forum" decisions eschew the common-law tendency to engage in outcome-determinative categorization of factual settings. Instead, the Court has concentrated on the ultimate question of
impartiality.
Unfortunately, the Court has been inconsistent in its articulation of
the standard of impartiality to be applied. The Supreme Court has
used at least two formulations in different cases: the "possible temptation" test, s4 and the "direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest"
test.ss However, regardless of which way the Court phrases the test it
applies, the emphasis is on the degree of danger to the impartial administration of justice, rather than the cause of the danger.
tion of Executive and Judicial Powers in State Government, 94 YALE L.J. 1675, 1676-77 (1985)
(reading Taylor and Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971) (trial judge who was the
object of the contemnor's insolent conduct could not be impartial in later contempt conviction),
for the proposition that appearance alone is sufficient).
The proposition that appearance of impropriety alone does not violate the due process clause
is probably also "the better view." After all, the concern for avoiding the appearance of impropriety is usually based upon preserving public respect for the law. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 EC 9-1, -2, -4, -6 (1981). The degree to which the
people of a state wish their legal system to be publicly respected would seem to be a matter of
state autonomy, and if a litigant receives a trial which is fair in fact, it is difficult to see how his
right to due process oflaw is violated merely because his fellow citizens believe otherwise. Cf. C.
WOLFRAM, supra note 7, at 319-23 (criticizing the "appearance" standard as it is misused in the
context of lawyer conflicts of interest).

50. Compare, e.g., Bonham's Case, 8 Coke 107a, 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (K.B. 1608) (discussed in
text at notes 32-34 supra), with Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973) (involving licensing
decisions made by a board of optometrists who stood to gain by restricting the number of
licenses).
.
51. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 106 S. Ct. 1580, 1584 (1986); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S.
510, 523 (1927).
52. Frank, supra note 27, at 4S.
S3. See text accompanying notes 42-4S supra.
54. See text accompanying notes 56-60, 101-19 infra.
SS. See text accompanying notes 56-S9, 83-100 infra.

392

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 86:382

1. Tumey v. Ohio: Interest or Bias?

The seminal case on constitutional disqualification is Tumey v.
Ohio. 56 Tumey was tried and convicted by the Mayor of the Village of
North College Hill, Ohio for violating Ohio's Prohibition Act. The
statutes in question gave the Mayor a right to $12 in costs for himself
and a $100 fine for the village only if Tumey were convicted. On the
basis of this interest, Tumey moved to disqualify the Mayor, but the
Mayor denied that request.
The United States Supreme Court reversed Tumey's conviction,
holding that the Mayor was disqualified from hearing the case because
of his interest in the result. Chief Justice Taft's opinion for a unanimous Court noted that while disqualification for interest was "the general rule," 57 some questions of judicial qualification "would seem
generally to be matters merely of legislative discretion." 58
But it certainly violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and deprives a defendant in a criminal case of due process of law, to subject his liberty or
property to the judgment of a court the judge of which has a direct,
personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against
him in his case. 59

Had the opinion ended there, the rule of Tumey v. Ohio would be both
simple and historically familiar: every litigant is entitled to a judge
without "a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest" in the outcome. However, the opinion did not end there. Addressing the fact
that the Mayor was only interested to the extent of $12, the Chief
Justice wrote:
There are doubtless mayors who would not allow such a consideration as
$12 costs in each case to affect their judgment in it; but the requirement
of due process of law in judicial procedure is not satisfied by the argument that men of the highest honor and the greatest self-sacrifice could
carry it on without danger of injustice. Every procedure which would
offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the
burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or which might lead
56. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
57. 273 U.S. at 522.
58. 273 U.S. at 523.
59. 273 U.S. at 523 (emphasis added). Chief Justice Taft's suggestion that the impartiality
requirement might be limited to criminal cases has not stood the test of time. Until recently, no
case had squarely held the requirement applicable to civil cases. See Leubsdorf, Constitutional
Civil Procedure, 63 TEXAS L. REV. 579, 624 (1984) (calling the absence of any decision so holding "the most extraordinary gap in our constitutional law of civil procedure"). However, a dictum in Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court in Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238 (1980),
asserted that the due process clause entitled litigants to a fair and impartial tribunal "in both civil
and criminal cases." 446 U.S. at 242. There was never much reason to doubt the Court's dictum; none of the opinions in the criminal and administrative situations in which the Court has
developed the right to an impartial tribunal have limited its scope to criminal or administrative
cases, or employed reasoning that does not apply with equal force to the civil realm. However,
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, J06 S. Ct. 1580 (1986) (applying the impartiality requirement in a
civil action), removes all doubt. The Lavoie case is discussed in the text accompanying notes 6466 & 89-95 infra.
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him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State and the

accused, denies the latter due process of law. 60
This "possible temptation" language appears much broader than the
"direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary" language, and it is difficult to
tell whether it simply amplifies the earlier test or instead suggests an
independent standard.
Apparently, the Court applied two independent tests in Tumey.
Chief Justice Taft noted that the Mayor's pecuniary interest was not
the only aspect of Mr. Tumey's trial which violated the strictures of
the due process clause. 61 An alternative basis for the holding was that
Mayor Pugh's capacity as the executive of his village placed him in
"two practically and seriously inconsistent positions, one partisan and
the other judicial, [which] necessarily involves a lack of due process of
law."62 Hence, the disqualification resulted "both because of his direct
pecuniary interest in the outcome, and because of his official
motive. " 63
2.

The Standard After Tumey

The alternative holdings in Tumey left the proper standard in
doubt. Was the due process clause violated whenever there existed
"possible temptation" to depart from neutrality? Or was it necessary
for the litigant asking for disqualification to show that the judge had a
"direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary" interest in the outcome? As
recently as two terms ago, the Court, speaking through Chief Justice
Burger, treated the matter as an open question in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Lavoie. 64 In that case Aetna challenged Alabama Supreme Court Justice Embry's refusal to disqualify himself from consideration of a case
even though he was a party to an essentially identical suit pending in a
lower state court. The Court found Justice Embry to have been impermissibly interested, but brushed aside Aetna's allegations of bias,
writing:
We need not decide whether allegations of bias or prejudice by a judge of
60. 273 U.S. at 532 (emphasis added). The proposition that the apparent insignificance of
the amount does not preclude a finding of impermissible interest was reaffirmed more recently in
Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245 (1977), in which the Court applied Tumey to strike down a
Georgia statutory scheme whereby nonsalaried justices of the peace were paid $5 for each search
warrant issued, but nothing for each search warrant denied.
61. 273 U.S. at 532.
62. 273 U.S. at 534.
63. 273 U.S. at 535. That either ground of disqualification would have been sufficient by
itself is indicated by Dugan v. Ohio, 277 U.S. 61 (1928). There the Court, again speaking
through Chief Justice Taft, upheld' a conviction and fine imposed by the Mayor of Xenia, Ohio.
Chief Justice Taft thought it necessary to emphasize both that "[t]he mayor of Xenia receives a
salary which is not dependent on whether he convicts in any case or not," 277 U.S. at 65, and
that "[t]he mayor has no executive, and exercises only judicial, functions," 277 U.S. at 63. The
negation of both aspects of Tumey strongly suggests that either one would have been sufficient by
itself.
64. 106 S. Ct. 1580 (1986).
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the type we have here would ever be sufficient under the Due Process
Clause to force recusal. Certainly only in the most extreme of cases
would disqualification on this basis be constitutionally required, and appellant's arguments here fall well below that level. 65

As Lavoie shows, the confusion over the proper standard has been aggravated by the considerable degree to which the two standards applied in Tumey overlap. 66
Careful examination of the decisions since Tumey suggests that
when both Tumey standards are applicable, the Supreme Court prefers
to rely on pecuniary interest. For instance, in Gibson v. Berryhill, 67 a
group of optometrists successfully challenged a state delicensing procedure as a violation of their due process rights to an impartial forum.
The "unprofessional conduct" with which the plaintiff optometrists
were charged consisted of accepting employment from a corporate
chain rather than establishing independent practices. The plaintiffs
claimed that the State Board of Optometry was biased against "corporate" optometrists, and that the state-law procedure was for that reason bound to result in their delicensing, depriving them of their
livelihoods without due process of law. The district court agreed and
enjoined the state-law administrative proceeding, 68 finding both bias69
and interest. 70 The Supreme Court affirmed solely on the basis of impermissible interest, although the majority opinion intimated that the
ruling as to impermissible bias was also correct.7 1
However, there have been many cases in which bias was present
but pecuniary interest was not, and in these cases the Court has not
hesitated to rely solely on the broader "possible temptation" test. One
such case was In re Murchison, 72 which involved a challenge to Michi65. 106 S. Ct. at 1585. The "bias" asserted in Lavoie - a "general frustration with insurance
companies,'' 106 S. Ct. at 1585-was clearly not in the same league with the "interest" asserted,
see notes 89-91 infra and accompanying text, and one can scarcely quarrel with the Court's
decision to rely only on the latter ground.
66. Presumably, most interests which are "direct, personal, substantial, [and] pecuniary"
also create "possible temptation[s] ... not to hold the balance nice, clear and true." Hence, the
Court is usually able to rely on the more traditional ground of pecuniary interest.
67. 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
68. 411 U.S. at 570-71.
69. 411 U.S. at 578. The district court identified two possible causes of bias. First, the Board
consisted exclusively of members of the Alabama Optometric Association, which excluded cor- porate optometrists. Second, the Board had performed a prosecutorial role in charging the plaintiffs with unprofessional conduct, and this prosecutorial role was bound to induce preconceived
notions of guilt. 411 U.S. at 578.
70. 411 U.S. at 578. The "interest" involved was the fact that delicensing all "corporate"
optometrists would have cut the number of optometrists practicing in the state nearly in half.
411 U.S. at 578.
71. 411 U.S. at 579. Justice White, speaking for the majority, wrote that "[a]rguably, the
District Court was right on both scores, but we need reach, and we affirm, only the latter ground
of possible personal interest." 411 U.S. at 579.
72. 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
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gan's "one-man grand jury" law73 whereby any judge of the state
could compel witnesses to testify before him in secret about suspected
crimes. Murchison was interrogated at length in secret, but the
judge-grand jury, apparently unconvinced by Murchison's testimony,
proceeded to charge, try, convict, and sentence Murchison for contempt. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction on the ground that
the judge was biased by his concurrent role as grand jury. 74 The
Court, over three dissenting votes, 75 explicitly relied on the "possible
temptation" language from Tumey. 16
More recently, the Court was faced with a descendant of the
Tumey "mayor's court" in Ward v. Village ofMonroeville. 77 In Ward,
as in Tumey, the Mayor convicted the accused of violating a municipal
ordinance and fined him. However in Ward, unlike in Tumey, the
Mayor did not receive any portion of the fines collected from traffic
violators, and thus no "direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest" was present. On this score, Justice Brennan wrote for the Court
that "[t]he fact that the mayor [in Tumey] shared directly in the fees
and costs did not define the limits of the principle. " 78 The test, he
said, was the "possible temptation" standard from Tumey, 79 and
under this test the Mayor's conflicting responsibilities for revenue pro73. See also In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
74. Murchison, 349 U.S. at 137-38. For other rulings to this effect in contempt cases, see
note 103 infra. The Supreme Court has also cautioned against the combination of prosecutorial
and adjudicatory functions in other contexts. See, e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 197-98
(1974) (White, J., concurring) (federal employee's pretermination hearing must be conducted by
someone other than the supervisor accused of slandering the employee); Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1972) (parole revocation hearing must be conducted by someone other
than the parole officer who ordered the defendant's arrest); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 449-53 (1970) (search warrant may not be issued by state attorney general directing
investigation of crime); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970) (termination of welfare
benefits requires a hearing before a decisionmaker who did not participate in the determination
under review); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 578 n.2 (1968) (absence of an impartial
factfinder at hearing to review teacher's dismissal deprived the Board of Education's findings of
weight and justified Supreme Court's independent review of the record); but see Marshall v.
Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 248 (1980) (assistant regional administrator of child labor enforcement agency not subject to strict requirement of neutrality, since his function was less judicial
than prosecutorial, and prosecutors "are necessarily permitted to be zealous in their enforcement
of the law"); Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975) (medical examining board's authority to
investigate physicians, present charges, rule upon the charges, and impose punishment does not
violate due process); FfC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 701 (1948) (even if commissioners were
biased by their prior roles as prosecutors, requirement of impartiality was satisfied as long as
their minds were not "irrevocably closed").
75. 349 U.S. at 139 (Reed and Minton, JJ., dissenting, joined by Burton, J.).
76. 349 U.S. at 136. Interestingly, the dissenters noted the majority's heavy reliance upon
Tumey but did not squarely confront the appropriateness of the "possible temptation" standard,
choosing instead merely to quote the "direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest" test in
response. 349 U.S. at 142 (Reed and Minton, JJ., dissenting, joined by Burton, J.).
77. 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
78. 409 U.S. at 60.
79. 409 U.S. at 60.
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duction and law enforcement80 infected the Ohio adjudicatory scheme
with constitutional invalidity.
In summary, it appears from Ward and Murchison that the more
general "possible temptation" standard from Tumey not only survives,
but envelops the older and narrower "direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest" test, even though the Supreme Court may refer only
to the narrower of the two when it has a choice. Part II analyzes the
constitutional status of campaign contributions under these standards.
II.

CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND THE RIGHT TO AN
IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL

The constitutional tests described in Part I suggest two distinct
ways in which a campaign contribution might constitute grounds for
disqualification under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. First, the campaign contribution may give the judge an impermissible financial interest in the litigation under Tumey's "direct,
personal, substantial, pecuniary" standard. 81 Alternatively, whether
or not campaign contributions constitute "interest," they may nonetheless be "possible temptation to the average man as a judge ... not
to hold the balance nice, clear and true," 82 under the broader of the
Tumey standards.
A.

Contributions as Interest

Campaign contributions are certainly "personal" and "pecuniary,"
and they may often be "substantial." 83 But can the interest created by
a campaign contribution ever be so "direct" that it violates the fourteenth amendment?
One answer which seems initially plausible is that a campaign contribution cannot be "interest" of any kind because it is wholly unrelated to the litigation. Because the contribution has by hypothesis
preceded the judgment, the judge keeps the money regardless of the
result in the litigation. It is tempting to conclude that this state of
affairs, far from constituting a "direct" interest in the litigation, shows
that there is in fact no correlation whatsoever between the outcome
and the contribution.
However, this argument ignores the fact that the contributors in
question here are typically lawyers, who are interested in the judge as
much for his general responsiveness to their arguments as for his decision in an isolated case. They have, by hypothesis, made prior contri80. It was on this basis that the Court distinguished Dugan v. Ohio, 277 U.S. 61 (1928),
discussed in note 63 supra. 409 U.S. at 60-61.
81. See text accompanying note 59 supra.
82. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
83. See text accompanying notes 143-45 infra.
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butions to a particular judge's campaign, and it is entirely reasonable
for the judge to assume that they will continue to contribute as long as
the contributor remains satisfied with the judge's performance. In
short, there may be a "course of dealing" 84 between the judge and the
lawyer-contributor85 which makes it reasonable for the judge to weigh
the importance of the contributor's continued support in arriving at a
decision. 86
Still, in the absence of actual bribery, 87 a campaign contribution is
hardly direct in the same way that the $12 fee in Tumey was direct. In
Tumey, a verdict of guilty put $12 in the judge's pocket, while averdict of not guilty left the judge uncompensated for trying the case.
Even if a judge assumes that he must keep a particular contributor
happy in general, the contributor surely cannot expect to win every
case before the judge; thus, the interest in any particular case would
seem to be something less than "direct."
However, the Supreme Court has not always required the directness present in Tumey. In Lavoie, 88 for example, Justice Embry's only
interest in the outcome was its precedential value: the fact that his
decision approved the largest punitive damage award of its kind in
Alabama history presumably enhanced the settlement value of Justice
Embry's own suit against a different insurer. 89 Although the Court
characterized this effect of Justice Embry's decision as "clear and immediate,"90 it is certainly a far cry from the directness involved in
taking $12 out of Mr. Tumey's pocket and placing it in Mayor
84. Cf. U.C.C. § 1-205(1) (1978): "A course of dealing is a sequence of previous conduct
between the parties to a particular transaction which is fairly to be regarded as establishing a
common basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions and other conduct."
85. A similar "course of dealing" may arise with nonattorneys who are so-called "institutional litigants"; i.e., those litigants who find themselves in court so often that costs incurred in
any one case may yield benefits in a whole range of other cases in the future. See D. LAYCOCK,
MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 855-56 (1985) (drawing a distinction between "one-shotters"
and "repeat players"). These litigants may know in advance that they will have a significant
number of cases before a particular judge simply by virtue of the frequency with which they sue
or are sued. Just as these litigants may treat a favorable result in an otherwise insignificant case
as an asset to be used in other cases, cf. Fairchild, Comment, 19 U. CHI. CONF. SERIES 9, 16
(1964), the favorable disposition of a judge is an asset which can be every bit as important to
these litigants as it is to a lawyer who practices often in the judge's court.
The difficulty with treating such litigants as lawyers for the purpose of due process analysis is
that it is difficult to draw any principled distinction between an "institutional litigant" and a
regular litigant that could reliably identify the former, let alone justify dissimilar treatment.
86. Note, however, that such a "course of dealing" is only relevant (indeed, only possible)
where the judge must someday campaign again. Thus, a system in which judges were elected to
life terms would avoid this particular constitutional difficulty, although it might still be subject to
the problems of bias explored in Part H.B. No state currently employs such a system. L. BERK·
SON, s. BELLER & M. GRIMALDI, supra note 2, at 1-46.
87. See note 8 supra.
88. See text accompanying notes 64-66 supra.
89. 106 S. Ct. at 1586.
90. 106 S. Ct. at 1586.
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Pugh's. 91
While nothing in Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion in Lavoie
explained the type of directness required, Justice Brennan's concurrence92 was more helpful. He pointed out that the Court had found
due process violations in cases where the "direct, personal, substantial,
pecuniary" test was not met. 93 But he also maintained that even under
this test, "an interest is sufficiently 'direct' if the outcome of the challenged proceeding substantially advances the judge's opportunity to
attain some desired goal even if that goal is not actually attained in
that proceeding." 94 Under this standard, the inquiry should be
whether a particular outcome substantially advances a judge's chance
of reelection.
The pervasive influence of money on modem elections demands
that substantial contributions be considered direct interest under this
standard. A survey of California judges conducted by the California
Judges' Association is informative in this connection. 95 One judge
who responded to the survey wrote, "[M]y 'reasons for winning' . . .
are as follows: (1) Money; (2) Organization; (3) An early start; (4)
Money; (5) An 'excellent' candidate; (6) A weak opponent; (7) Excellent public relations and use of media advice; (8) Money; (9) Luck." 96
Elaborating on the importance of money, this respondent opined that
"[t]here is no way in a metropolitan area [of four hundred thousand
registered voters] that you can do anything effective without a large
amount of money since both electronic media and direct mail are very
costly." 97 This need for funding has a predictable effect on the way
judges view attorney support. As another respondent wrote, "I would
solicit and expect more help from local attorneys next time. Because
of the ethical problems, I avoided the whole issue. If the Bar wants
competent judges (and in my case the issue was clear) it must get down
in the dirt with us. " 98 When there is reason to believe that a judge
91. See text accompanying notes 56-59 supra.
92. 106 S. Ct. at 1589.
93. 106 S. Ct. at 1589. Justice Brennan cited Murchison, discussed in the text accompanying
notes 72-76 supra, as an example.
94. 106 S. Ct. at 1589-90. Justice Brennan cited Ward, 409 U.S. 57 (1972), discussed in the
text accompanying notes 77-80 supra, and Gibson, 411 U.S. 564 (1973), discussed in the text
accompanying notes 67-71 supra, for this proposition, and added, "Nothing in the Court's opin·
ion should be read, as I understand it, to limit these precedents in any way." 106 S. Ct. at 1590.
95. See Schotland, supra note 18, at 155.
96. Id. (emphasis in original). Perhaps it is reassuring that the relative merits of the candi·
dates finished ahead of "luck" in importance, but still one might have hoped for higher showings
than fifth and sixth. In any event, the quality factor lost two out of three to money.
97. Id. A Northwestern Law School professor who ran a losing campaign concurs. "My
runningmates and I had substantial funding, around $175,000, ... but still there was time to tell
the voter little more than he or she is told in an equal amount of time about the comparative
effectiveness of Duz and Dash." Waltz, Some Firsthand Observations on the Election of Judges,
63 JUDICATURE 185, 186-87 (1979).
98. Schotland, supra note 18, at 155 (emphasis added).

November 1987]

Note -

Judicial Campaign Contributions

399

depends upon one of the attorneys before him for the financial support
he so desperately needs, the judge should be deemed to have an interest in the outcome which is sufficiently direct under the Brennan test
that it offends due process.
Justice Brennan's test for the directness of the interest is consistent
not only with the precedent he cites, but also with the modern emphasis on the fact of partiality rather than its cause. 99 Under that test, it
seems clear that some campaign contributions are significant enough
that it would constitute a denial of due process for the recipient to
preside over a case involving the donor. Just as the common-law concept of interest expanded with changing economic conditions to include interests such as the ownership of stock in a corporate party, 100
the constitutional concept of interest should now broaden to encompass a judge's reasonable expectation of continued political support.

B. Campaign Contributions as ''Possible Temptation"
If a particularly large campaign contribution constitutes a "direct,
personal, substantial, pecuniary interest," it is a fortiori a "possible
temptation to the average man as judge . . . not to hold the balance
nice, clear and true." 101 Hence, the arguments of Part II.A apply with
even greater force to the possible temptation standard than to the pecuniary interest test. Under this broader standard the question is no
longer whether campaign contributions can be categorized as "interest"; it is now whether certain large contributions from attorneys affect the impartiality of sitting judges. 102 Even if advancing one's
chance of reelection is not a direct pecuniary interest, it must be presumed to be a temptation for anyone who is actually running for office.
However, there are independent reasons to question the impartiality of judges when major contributors practice before them. These
reasons have to do not with the judge's expectation of future gain, but
rather with the extent to which the judge is favorably or unfavorably
disposed toward a litigant as a result of past support. Supreme Court
decisions in analogous areas suggest that this personal favoritism may
sometimes rise to unconstitutional levels.
The easiest analogy is to the law of contempt. In this area, the
Supreme Court has held repeatedly that unless immediate action by
the trial judge is necessary to prevent hindrance of the administration
of justice, a judge who has been personally insulted or angered by al99. See text accompanying notes 42-45 supra.
100. See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
101. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927)
102. Consider the shift in emphasis from the early common law to the later common law and
statutory law on disqualification, discussed in the text accompanying notes 42·45 supra, as well
as the tendency toward generalization which has animated the constitutional "impartial forum"
decisions, discussed in the text accompanying notes 64-80 supra.
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legedly contemptible behavior may sit at the contempt hearing only at
the risk of denying due process of law. 103 The theory of these cases is
not that the trial judge has anything to gain by holding the defendant
in contempt, but rather that impartiality is not possible because of
prior dealings between the two. 104
The same reasoning applies to situations where one of the parties is
a large contributor to the judge's election campaign. 105 Even if the
judge has no reason to expect that the supporter in question will stop
contributing as soon as the judge renders an adverse decision, the
judge's sympathies in the situation will be altered. 106 This is not to say
that all judges or even most judges will twist and bend the law until it
comes out in their supporters' favor. 107 It is only to say that the nonsupporter has reason to fear that he is starting with a handicap in such
circumstances, and "possible temptation" exists regardless of whether
or not the judge actually fails to discharge his duty of impartiality.
This personal bias may sometimes operate in situations that seem
at first blush to involve far less probability of unfairness than either the
contempt cases just examined or the political contribution scenario.
For instance, in Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, 108 Justice
Frankfurter recused himself from a case challenging the District of
Columbia's practice of broadcasting radio programs in public busses.109 He noted, "My feelings are so strongly engaged as a victim of
the practice in controversy that I had better not participate in judicial
judgment upon it." 110 The degree of bias present in that case might
103. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971); Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11
(1954); Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925).
104. See Mayberry, 400 U.S. at 465; Offutt, 348 U.S. at 17-18; Cooke, 267 U.S. at 539. Cj
the problem of conspicuous noncontributors raised in note 8 supra.
105. If anything the argument is stronger in the context of campaign contributions. In contempt proceedings, at least it is the behavior of the contemnor that is in question. However, a
litigant who is disadvantaged by an opposing attorney's political support for the judge will in
most cases have nothing to do with the source of the favoritism. As repugnant as it is for impartiality to be precluded by one's own political beliefs, it seems all the worse when the source of the
bias is the political beliefs of one's attorney-or the attorney of one's opponent.
106. Ethical Dilemma, supra note 17, at 402-03. One respondent to this nationwide survey of
state court judges stated, "I very much appreciated the contributions I received from others.
However, it makes me feel uncomfortable dealing with them in court." Id. at 402.
This same judge continued, "Perhaps it would be better if we didn't know where the contributions came from." Id. at 402-03. However, other judges disagreed, mostly on the ground that
a judge must be able to recuse himself in a case involving a contributor. Id. at 403.
107. Indeed, the direction in which the judge's sympathies may be altered is by no means
clear. One judge who responded to the Ethical Dilemma survey, supra note 17, wrote that when
a political contributor comes before him, he makes a practice of telling the opposing counsel. "If
he or his client requests, I will then disqualify myself. Usually they don't, perhaps thinking I'll
bend over backwards to the other side, which perhaps sub-consciously [sic] I might." Id. at 403
(emphasis added).
108. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
109. 343 U.S. at 466-67.
110. 343 U.S. at 467.
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have seemed trivial to some, but to Justice Frankfurter his recusal followed from a broader principle:
The judicial process demands that a judge ... think dispassionately and
submerge private feeling on every aspect of a case.... This is achieved
through training, professional habits, self-discipline and that fortunate
alchemy by which men are loyal to the obligation with which they are
entrusted. But it is also true that reason cannot control the subconscious
influence of feelings of which it is unaware. When there is ground for
believing that such unconscious feelings may operate in the ultimate
judgment, or may not unfairly lead others to believe they are operating,
judges recuse themselves.... The guiding consideration is that the administration of justice should reasonably appear to be disinterested as
well as be so in fact. 111

Some may object that attempting to eliminate bias from the judicial process altogether is taking things too far. 112 Indeed, on some
views of the judicial process, bias is so inevitable that disqualification
for any one ground of bias - such as political support - is pointless.
Consider Jerome Frank:
[U]niquely individual factors often are more important causes of judgments than anything which could be described as political, economic, or
moral biases. . . .
... [T]hese more minute and distinctly personal biases are operating
constantly. So the judge's sympathies and antipathies are likely to be
active with respect to the persons of the witness, the attorneys and the
parties to the suit.... A certain twang or cough or gesture ... may affect
the judge's initial hearing of, or subsequent recollection of, what the witness said, or the weight or credibility which the judge will attach to the
witness's testimony.113

If Frank's view of the enterprise of adjudication is correct, then the
111. 343 U.S. at 466-67 (emphasis added). Justice Frankfurter was speaking only of discretionary recusal; the constitutional significance of mere "appearance of impropriety" unaccompanied by a probability of actual bias is doubted in note 48 supra. However, since observers could
hardly have known much about the intensity of Justice Frankfurter's opinion about the bus
broadcasts (or even whether he rode the bus to Capitol Hill each morning), appearance probably
played little part in his decision to recuse himself.
112. Contrast with Justice Frankfurter's decision the following anecdote told by Chief Justice Rehnquist in 1973:
I was sitting with a group of people whom I didn't know very well at a dinner party in
Washington ... during the time the Watergate hearings were being televised daily. Not long
after we sat down, the subject turned, as it doubtless did at most other dinner parties in
Washington that evening, to the subject of Watergate and what the various diners thought
of the various witnesses. In the midst of the discussion, one of the speakers turned to me
and said: "Wait a minute. We probably shouldn't be talking about this in front of you,
because it will probably come to the Supreme Court eventually."
I thanked him for his consideration, but added that iflistening to this discussion were to
render me damaged goods for the purpose of adjudication, it was at most harmless error in
view of the damage I had already sustained by being exposed to the daily newspapers and
television news programs.
Rehnquist, supra note 38, at 711.
113. J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 106 (1930) (footnote omitted).
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thesis of this Note might be thought to be ridiculously underinclusive.
Is there a response?
Certainly, one response would be to dispute Frank's characterization of the enterprise of adjudication, but a critique of Legal Realism is
beyond the scope of this Note. However, even if Frank is correct in
asserting that judicial bias is inevitable, there is a special case for eliminating bias from political sources. "A certain twang or cough or gesture" may, unfortunately, affect a judge's decision in any particular
case; and if that is inevitable, then more is the pity. But no state currently selects its judges on the basis of twangs, coughs, gestures, or a
judicial candidate's reactions thereto. Forty-three states do select
judges on the basis of their ability to develop political connections and
attract political support. Given that the state's authority will be reposed in some judges precisely because of their political views and affiliations, the state has a special duty to neutralize the improper effects of
its own selection process, even if it cannot hope to control for all possible sources of bias.
Of course, the question of whether the possible temptation
presented by large contributions rises to constitutional magnitude is
ultimately a factual question about human nature itself. Can campaign contributions which fall short of bribery really cause any judge
to show favoritism to a party? Some statistics indicate that at the very
least, many contributors think so. 114 In Cook County, for instance,
unopposed candidates raised substantial sums of money over and
above their modest needs, 115 and data on attorney contributions in
particular show that "the tendency to give heavily to sitting judges
was more pronounced for attorney contributors" than it was for
nonattorney contributors. 116 These researchers concluded that "the
data suggests [sic] that a great many contributions are given for rea114. It may seem odd to argue for the utility of a "temptation" standard, which focuses on
the mental state of the judge, by pointing to the motivations of some contributors. However, it
would be difficult to explain the persistence of the belief among many contributors that the cost
of contributing is justified by the favor it buys unless the lawyers confessing such motivations had
some reason to believe that their contributions did in fact work to their clients' advantage in
court.
115. See Nicholson & Weiss, supra note 6, at 20.
116. Id. at 22. Nicholson and Weiss note that the "strong attorney preference for sitting
judges [is] independent of whether the candidate is expected to win or lose." They explain,
Because of the size of the Cook County court system, contributors cannot know whether
they will ever practice before successful partisan candidates. Therefore, the possibility of
obtaining influence may be remote when contributions are given to expected winners. On
the other hand, attorneys may have to deal on a day-to-day basis with sitting judge candidates.... Although there may be legitimate reasons why attorneys contribute so heavily to
sitting judge candidates, even when they know they will lose, it is difficult to dispel the
impression that some of these contributions are given for improper motives.
Id. (footnote omitted). Predictions of a candidate's success are unusually reliable in Cook
County, due to its highly partisan style of politics and its heavily Democratic demography. Id. at
18.
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sons other than to assure the victory of qualified candidates." 117
These trends certainly do not prove that judges or attorneys are corrupt, 118 and they do not necessarily prove that attorneys are "getting
their money's worth." However, the inadequacy of any apparent legitimate explanation suggests a substantial possibility of constitutional
violations. 119
C. Assessing a Contribution's Legitimacy
Not all campaign contributions create constitutional difficulties.
Courts should determine whether a recipient-judge's participation
raises constitutional questions by evaluating the amount of the contribution in question, the timing of the contribution, and the pattern of
support, if any, existing between the contributor and the judge.
The most obvious criterion for evaluating the legitimacy of a contribution is the amount. 120 However, the amount should be evaluated
with respect to the importance of the contribution to the judge rather
than the importance of the judge to the contributor. 121 If the judge
117. Id. at 25.
118. See note 8 supra.
119. Whether or not the states or the legal profession are willing to indulge in the assumption
that attorney contributions can actually bias a judge sworn to impartiality, there can be little
doubt that the general public embraces such an assumption without reservation. For examples of
this sentiment, see Baum, Query: Should Judges Know Who Gave to Their Campaigns?, 60 JUDICATURE 258 (1977), in which the author quotes citizens of Detroit who assume that attorney
contributions are attempts to "curry favor," create an obligation on the judge's part "to repay the
favor," or engage in "a form of bribery." Id. at 258.
As observed in notes 48 & 49 supra, the constitutional significance of the improper appearance of some contributions is uncertain. However, there can be little doubt that some contributions do create such an improper appearance. Nicholson & Weiss wrote of their data, "Although
there are plausible explanations other than that the contributors are seeking undue influence, an
aura of impropriety is difficult to dispel." Nicholson & Weiss, supra note 6, at 25 (footnote omitted). Another commentator has summed up the problem of attorney contributions to judicial
campaigns by noting, "There may be some other questionable yet lawful and largely accepted
practice that similarly undermines respect for judicial integrity and impartiality, but none comes
to mind." Schotland, supra note 18, at 90. Whether or not the damage these contributions do to
public respect for the judiciary is relevant to the constitutional inquiry, it certainly presents a
compelling prudential reason for the states to adopt the reforms suggested in Part III infra.
120. Or perhaps more aptly, the "substantiality" of the amount. Arguably, the constitutional significance of a contribution should be measured with respect to the total cost of the
judge's campaign, or perhaps the total of his contributions. One problem with the latter, however, is that the better a judge is at parlaying his influence into contributions, the less significant
each contribution will look, even if quite sizeable in absolute terms.
While the cost of judicial campaigns varies widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, judicial
election campaigns generally cost less than campaigns for other elective offices at the same level
of government. See Schotland, supra note 18, at 60, 112.
The focus on amount obviously fits very poorly when the question is the judge's impartiality
with respect to one who has provided nonpecuniary support, see note 8 supra. The analogous
concept in the realm of nonpecuniary support might be called "intimacy," and courts might
evaluate it by examining how closely the supporter worked with the judge, or how instrumental
the support was in bringing about the judge's subsequent election. Whether the question is
framed in terms of"amount," "substantiality," "intimacy," or something else, the ultimate question is the extent to which a judge may feel grateful or indebted to a particular supporter.
121. But see Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics of The Association of the Bar of
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does not rule in the contributor's favor, what will be the deleterious
consequences for the judge's chance of reelection? To what extent is
the judge likely to feel that he owes a favor to the contributor? To
what extent would the judge simply like to see the contributor win,
regardless of any personal gain? If the amount of the contribution is
high enough that the judge's self-interest, gratitude, or personal sympathy clearly operate in favor of his supporter, the probability of unfairness in court is very high.122
Courts should also look at the timing of the contribution. A substantial contribution made five or six years before the judge must stand
for reelection looks more suspicious (and may be more conspicuous to
the judge) than a contribution of the same amount made two or three
months before the election. 123 But a proper inquiry into the timing of
the contribution must also take account of the political and legal contexts in which the contribution is given. Even fairly large contributions might seem legitimate if given two months before the election to
help out a candidate in a tight race, or within a few months after the
election to help retire a heavy campaign debt. The picture changes,
however, if the recipient looks like a landslide winner two months
before the election, 124 or if there is no campaign debt. Likewise, the
pendency oflitigation may arouse suspicion. 125 Joseph D. Jamail, lead
counsel for Pennzoil in its recent suit with Texaco over the acquisition
of Getty Oil, 126 made two contributions of $10,000 each two days after
filing the answer in that case. The first was to the pre-trial judge, and
the second was to the judge who assigned trial judges. 127 This of
course is not conclusive evidence of impropriety, but courts must take
The City of New York, Ethical Guidelines for Judicial Campaigns, Opinion No. 882, 28 REC.
A.B. CITY N.Y. 364, 365-66 (1973) [hereinafter Ethical Guidelines] (taking the counter-intuitive
position that the important ethical consideration is whether the contribution is out of proportion
to the contributor's ability to pay).
122. The degree of temptation which might serve as the constitutional threshold is open to
dispute. However, most states have laws forbidding the use of campaign funds for personal
expenses, and in these states at least the threshold amount could be safely set above the amount
which would trigger due process concerns in states that allow candidates to use campaign funds
for expenditures other than campaigning. Cf Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), in which the
"mayor's court" system that the Supreme Court invalidated added about $700 to the Mayor's
annual income. 273 U.S. at 522.
123. Cf CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(2) (1972), which limits the solicitatio11 of
campaign funds to a period of90 days (subject to modification by each state) before and after the
election. The text of Canon 7(B) is set forth in note 11 supra.
124. See Schotland, supra note 18, at 94: "In Pennsylvania's 1983 supreme court election,
for example, the winning candidate received about 53% of his $193,575 campaign funds from
lawyers; but over $75,000 of that was raised after he had won both parties' nominations in the
primaries, and of that sum, 75% came from lawyers."
125. See Ethical Guidelines, supra note 121, at 365.
126. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., No. 84-05905 (Tex. Dist. Dec. 10, 1985).
127. Comment, Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co.: Some Thoughts on the Limits of Federal Court
Power Over State Court Proceedings, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 767, 768 n.10 (1986). "[The pre-trial
judge] was running unopposed in the primary, and the sum was large by local standards." Id.
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note of timing considerations such as these if they are to reach an
accurate conclusion about contributions which are in other respects
questionable.
Finally, courts should consider' any pattern of past contributions.
For instance, a well-established pattern of support would generally indicate the sort of "course of dealing" between judge and attorney that
raises the probability of bias in court. 128 However, such patterns may
support conflicting inferences, and a pattern of support might actually
mitigate an otherwise suspicious transaction. If Smith's first contribution to Judge Jones occurs two days after Smith files a pleading in ,
litigation before Judge Jones, the transaction appears suspicious and
due process concerns arise. However, if Smith has been contributing
to Judge Jones for the last fifteen years, during which time he has
never appeared before Judge Jones, the situation intuitively seems less
improper. And the "course of dealing" rationale confirms this intuition: By all indications, the course of dealing between Smith and
Jones is such that Smith will continue to contribute no matter what.
Hence Judge Jones has less reason to worry about satisfying Smith,
and the opposing party has less reason to worry about Judge Jones.
None of these factors should be taken in isolation to produce a
result either way. 129 However, by evaluating exceptional contributions with respect to all of these factors, courts can draw inferences
about the relationship between judge and litigant. Extremely large
contributions will often constitute "possible temptation" to depart
from neutrality whether or not any of the other circumstances surrounding the contribution look suspicious. However, when a judge
accepts contributions of even moderate amounts for which there are
Texaco sought recusal, but that motion was denied. Id. (citing the transcripts of the unpublished
decision cited in note 126 supra).
When Texaco filed a complaint in federal district court seeking an injunction against enforcement of this judgment, it renewed these allegations of judicial impropriety, but Judge Brieant
apparently regarded the fact that the contributions were so openly given as evidence that they
were legitimate. He confined his rather glib rejection of Texaco's allegations to a single footnote,
writing,
That some judicial goodwill eventuated to the contributing lawyer we may assume. Goodwill means perhaps his brief will be accepted a day late, a golfing continuance may be
granted, and his jokes may evoke more judicial laughter than they otherwise deserve. But it
is impossible for a lawyer to rub his own goodwill off onto the client, or the merits of his
client's cause.
Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 626 F. Supp. 250, 254 n.3 (S.D.N.Y.), ajfd. in part and revd. in part,
784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1986). As an example of the subtle art of writing with a wink, this
disposition of the issue is superb. As a rational argument why Texaco should be forced to litigate
under such circumstances, Judge Brieant's response is far less satisfactory. See also Petzinger &
Solomon, Texaco Case Spotlights Questions on Integrity of the Courts in Texas, Wall St. J., Nov.
4, 1987, at l, col. 6 (Midwest ed.).
128. See notes 84-86 supra and accompanying text.
129. Of course, the amount is probably the most important factor, with the others working in
mitigation or aggravation. For instance, it is highly unlikely that due process concerns arise over
a five-dollar contribution, no matter what the other circumstances are (unless of course the judge
is insulted by the contributor's "generosity").
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no plausible legitimate explanations, the danger that a litigant will be
denied his due process right to an impartial forum may be increased.
Part III addresses the question of what courts should do in such
circumstances.
III.

THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY

The argument thus far has been almost syllogistically straightforward. The due process clause grants to each litigant the right to a
judge who has neither a "direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest" in the outcome, nor a "possible temptation . . . not to hold the
balance nice, clear and true." 130 Some campaign contributions are significant enough to the judge that they preclude his impartiality. 13 1
Therefore, the due process clause is violated when any litigant is
forced to try his case before a judge who is likely to have been influenced by a prior contribution from opposing counsel.
But this "conclusion" is really only the beginning of a more daunting inquiry: What is to be done to protect the due process rights that
are currently being violated? This question is by its nature more speculative, and the conclusions must accordingly be more tentative. This
Part first examines the remedy usually employed to redress due process violations, 132 but then moves on to consider whether problems
associated with the usual remedy make prevention the best
medicine. 133
A.

The Pound of Cure: Recusal

A litigant who is denied due process under the standards discussed
in Part II will in most cases be entitled to a new trial with a new
judge. 134 Whenever the constitutional deficiency in the first trial is an
130. The derivation of these two standards from Supreme Court decisions is the subject of
Part I.B.2 supra.
131. This proposition is defended in Part II supra.
132. See text accompanying notes 134-61 infra.
133. See text accompanying notes 162-98 infra.
134. Occasionally in the realm of nonconstitutional disqualification resulting from relationships between a judge and an attorney, the attorney is disqualified rather than the judge. See, e.g.,
Young v. Champion, 142 Ga. App. 687, 236 S.E.2d 783 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977) (disqualifying city
commissioner from practicing before the recorder's court because city commission was responsible for selecting the judge of the recorder's court). However, the effects of such disqualifications
on both lawyers and clients, perhaps tolerable in the isolated case, make a blanket rule of attorney disqualification undesirable. First, such a rule would "deprive[] the resulting unrepresented
client of a free choice of counsel and [would] almost inevitably entail additional expense and
delay." C. WOLFRAM, supra note 7, § 7.1.3, at 318. This deprivation could be all the more
severe if it had been sought in order "to gain strategic advantage in litigation by depriving an
opponent of the services of an advocate known by experience to be particularly effective." Id.
(footnote omitted).
Second, a policy of attorney disqualification would force the attorney to strike a balance
between the unfettered exercise of his first amendment freedoms of political participation, see
Part III.B infra, and the unfettered practice of his profession. Part III.B.2 argues that states may
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aberration involving only one particular judge or one particular litigant, 135 such a disposition of the case will satisfy the requirement of an
impartial forum. 136 Sometimes, however, the adjudicatory system in
question is constructed so that the disqualifying factor is a necessary
concomitant of any trial; 137 in these cases an order remanding the case
"for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion" 138 is tantamount to the invalidation of the entire system.139
Conceptually, a due process claim based on an extraordinary campaign contribution would seem to be of the aberrational variety. By
hypothesis, the due process concerns arise only because of some special relationship between the judge and counsel for one of the parties.
There will undoubtedly be a great many cases in which no such relationship is present, and which therefore pose no due process problem
at all. Only if the threat to impartiality were systemic would invalidation of the system be appropriate, and there is no reason to think that
this is .true of state judicial elections: some judges decline contributions, and judicial elections could conceivably be run without attorney
contributions at all.140
However, state judicial elections aren't in fact run without attorney
not prohibit independent expenditures on behalf of judicial candidates, and if that conclusion is
sound then it ought to follow that the state may not force lawyers to engage in self-censorship.
As for state restrictions on political contributions, Part III.B.1 argues that these are constitutional. If that conclusion is sound, then perhaps states could pursue a policy of attorney disqualification for contributions only. However, such a policy would be no more effective than direct
regulation, and would have the distinct disadvantage of infringing client freedom of choice of
counsel.
135. See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 106 S. Ct. 1580 (1986) Gudge was plaintiff in a
similar suit pending in lower court); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971) (contempt
for insults to judge); Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954) (contempt); In re Oliver, 333
U.S. 257 (1948) (contempt proceedings before judge-grand jury); Cooke v. United States, 267
U.S. 517 (1925) (contempt, but not in open court). Cf Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 197-98
(1974) (White, J., concurring) (federal employee's pretermination hearing conducted by supervisor accused of slandering the employee).
136. Hence, Aetna's right to an impartial forum was fully secured by remanding the case to
the Alabama Supreme Court, sitting without Justice Embry.
137. See, e.g., Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973) (state licensing procedure for optometrists); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972) ("mayor's court"); In re Murchison,
349 U.S. 133 (1955) (one-man grand jury); Washington ex rel Seattle Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278
U.S. 116 (1928) (veto over zoning ordinances given to neighbors, who owe no duty to be reasonable or to consider any interests but their own); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) ("mayor's
court"); Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912) (zoning decisions made by residents
of block, who owe no duty to be reasonable or to consider any interests but their own).
138. See, e.g., Ward, 409 U.S. at 62.
139. See Ward, 409 U.S. at 62 (White, J., dissenting). The facts of Ward illustrate perfectly
the phenomenon described in the text. Remanding Clarence Ward's case to the "mayor's court"
in Monroeville, Ohio would not have remedied the due process violation (even if Monroeville had
elected a new mayor by the time of remand) because any fine imposed on any offender by anyone
exercising the powers that the Monroeville charter granted to the mayor would be subject to the
objection that the judge imposing the fine had been biased toward a verdict of guilty by his
concurrent role as mayor.
140. But see notes 95-98 supra and accompanying text.
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contributions. On the contrary, attorneys are the largest single group
of contributors. 141 Therefore, even if the proper remedy is simply a
different judge in each individual case rather than a judicial invalidation of the entire system, recusal might not be a realistic solution to
the problem. If instances of extraordinary campaign contributions are
too frequent, there will be a dearth of uninfluenced judges. 142
Empirical conclusions about the frequency of extraordinary campaign contributions are hard to come by. However, some data suggest
that, at least in some jurisdictions, due process violations are frequent
indeed. Schotland's research reveals that in the 1981-1983 races for
the Pennsylvania appellate courts, sixty-six attorneys contributed
amounts of $500 or greater, with seventeen contributing more than
$2,000 and six contributing more than $5,000. 143 Furthermore, the
statements of some local attorneys indicate that many of these contributors were motivated by something other than an unusually high regard for the candidates in question. A recent series of articles in the
Philadelphia Inquirer quotes one western Pennsylvania lawyer as saying that he, "like any other lawyer in town," believed that refusing to
contribute to a judge's campaign would jeopardize the interests of his
firm and its clients in that judge's courtroom. 144 Another lawyer
stated that a $1,000 donation for Supreme Court justices was all but
required, 145 and many law firms apparently "cover" themselves either
by supporting both candidates or by sending a check to the winner
after the election. 146 Recusal in every case argued by one of these attorneys or their firms might well be impracticable at the appellate
level.147
141. Schotland, supra note 18, at 118.
142. See Rocha v. Ahmad, 662 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983), in which the Texas Court of
Appeals rejected a motion to disqualify two of its justices on the allegation that opposing counsel
had contributed "many thousands of dollars" to the justices in the past. 662 S.W.2d at 77. The
court seemed to recoil at the logical implications of the argument, asserting,
If a judge cannot sit on a case in which a contributing lawyer is involved as counsel, judges
who have been elected would have to recuse themselves in perhaps a majority ofthe cases filed
in their courts. Perhaps the next step would be to require a judge to recuse himself in any
case in which one of the lawyers had refused to contribute or, worse still, had contributed to
that judge's opponent.
662 S.W.2d at 78 (emphasis added). No constitutional claim was made in Rocha.
143. Schotland, supra note 18, at 149.
144. Biddle, Fear Contributes to Lawyer Do11atio11s, Philadelphia Inquirer, May 15, 1983, at
21-A, col. 1.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Furthermore, there is reason to believe that the situation might be more desperate still
with respect to small towns with only one or two trial judges and few lawyers, or specialized
courts like probate courts which customarily appoint executors and the like from a fairly exclusive list of attorneys. Cf. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 7, § 7.1.3, at 318. Unfortunately, these specialized courts may present the most danger of improper political influence. A Colorado
attorney has written, "Many [practicing lawyers] will recall telephone calls from court clerks in
which they are told the exact dollar amounts of fees they have received through court appointments since the last election and what percentage of this amount they are expected to contribute
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The administrative burden which constitutionally mandated
recusal would force upon the states is thus a heavy one. In light of this
fact, it might be argued that the "Rule of Necessity" ends the recusal
question here. According to that ancient common-law doctrine, a
judge, even though disqualified from hearing a particular case, may
nonetheless hear the case if no determination could otherwise be
had. 148 Thus, the argument would run, the very impracticability of
disqualifying judges in so many individual cases on the basis of past
political support from one of the attorneys dictates, under the Rule of
Necessity, that no judge be disqualified on that basis.
However, any such argument should be rejected. The Rule of Necessity "can be justified only by strict and imperious necessity." 149
Thus, in United States v. Will, 150 the Supreme Court was forced to
hear a case involving the compensation clause of article III 151 even
though the federal disqualification statute 152 seemed to disqualify all
the justices from hearing such a case. The basis for the decision was
that all article III judges would have been similarly disqualified; even
the Chief Justice's statutory authorization to remit direct appeals 153 to
the court of appeals whenever disqualification precludes a quorum, 154
combined with his statutory power to reassign other federal judges to
sit temporarily, 155 could not have produced a competent tribunal. 156
It was thus a case of absolute necessity, where even the normal procedures for substitution were inadequate and a constitutional right was
in need of determination.151
in the campaign." Anderson, Ethical Problems ofLawyers and Judges in Election Campaigns, 50
A.B.A. J. 819, 821 (1964).
148. See generally Annotation, Necessity as Justifying Action by Judicial or Administrative
Officer Othenvise Disqualified to Act in Particular Case, 39 A.L.R. 1476 (1925). On the origins of
the Rule of Necessity, see note 37 supra and accompanying text.
149. Annotation, supra note 148, at 1479.
150. 449 U.S. 200 (1980).
151. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (providing that the compensation of a federal judge shall not
be diminished while in office).
152. 28 u.s.c. § 455 (1982).
153. The Will case was appealed to the Supreme Court directly from the district court under
28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1982), which permits direct appeal from any district court decision invalidating an act of Congress. Will, 449 U.S. at 210-11.
154. 28 U.S.C. § 2109 (1982). Had the case not been on direct appeal, see note 153 supra,
§ 2109 would have directed the Court to affirm the decision of the court of appeals. However,
§ 2109 guarantees the right to at least one appeal in cases invalidating acts of Congress.
155. 28 u.s.c. §§ 291-96 (1982).
156. Will, 449 U.S. at 212-13.
157. See also Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920) (involving a federal district judge's challenge to the income tax as a violation of the compensation clause):
Because of the individual relation of the members of this court to the question, ... we
cannot but regret that its solution falls to us .... But jurisdiction of the present case cannot
be declined or renounced. The plaintiff was entitled by law to invoke our decision on the
question as respects his own compensation, ... and there was no other appellate tribunal to
which under the law he could go.
253 U.S. at 247-48.
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Contrast with these cases of absolute necessity the far less desperate (though admittedly serious) problem of political disqualification.
It would be surprising indeed if anyone were so liberal with his contributions that all judges were disqualified from hearing him argue a
case. Even in small jurisdictions, or on appellate courts, where a situation of absolute necessity might most plausibly arise, states could provide for substitution of judges 158 or even for the creation of special
tribunals 159 to mitigate the problem or even eliminate it entirely. 160 In
short, the serious administrative burden which constitutionally mandated recusal would place on the states makes recusal unattractive as a
matter of state administration of justice; but the problem of how to
vindicate the constitutional rights 161 of litigants remains one of convenience, not necessity. The Rule of Necessity thus cannot absolve
states of their constitutional duty to provide each and every litigant
with an impartial forum. Each of the forty-three states that elect their
judges is faced with a choice between leaving many of its judgments
vulnerable to attack on due process grounds or taking more effective
measures to protect litigants' rights. Part 111.B examines the feasibility and efficacy of using campaign finance regulations to preserve the
impartiality of state tribunals.
B.

The Ounce of Prevention: Regulating Campaign Contributions

A due process violation of the type discussed in this Note stems
not from the fact that a judge is elected, but from the fact that his
contributors have impermissibly biased him in the decision of a particular case. Thus, rather than requiring recusal of a great many judges,
a state may prefer to attack the problem by limiting campaign
contributions.
158. See, e.g., Miss. CONST. art. 6, § 165; MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 9-1-13, 11-1-15 (1972).
159. See, e.g., Johnson v. Darr, 272 S.W. 1098 (Special Supreme Court of Texas 1925), which
involved an appeal by a fraternal organization to which all the justices of the Texas Supreme
Court belonged. The Governor of Texas used his statutory authority to appoint a Special
Supreme Court, composed of three women, to hear the case. 272 S.W. at 1098. Some Governors
still possess similar authority. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-2-102 (1980).
160. It is difficult to imagine how absolute necessity could ever arise in a jurisdiction in which
some state official wielded the power of temporary appointment mentioned in note 159 supra.
161. Note that the constitutional rights present in the compensation clause cases and in the
impartial forum cases are crucially different. In Will and Evans, the constitutional right at issue
was the subject matter of the suit in which the disqualification problem arose. Strict application
of constitutional disqualification doctrine, unameliorated by the Rule of Necessity, would have
led to the intolerable result that the claimed constitutional right could not have been vindicated
in any court of the United States. In such a case, it could well be said that imperfect justice was
better than no justice at all.
In contrast, the due process right to an impartial forum may arise in any substantive context.
The underlying dispute may be a claim in tort or contract, which presents a far less compelling
case for "resolution at any cost." The constitutional right involved is concerned precisely with
the way in which the state resolves the underlying claim. In such a situation, the Rule of Necessity, far from providing the only means of vindicating an important constitutional right, is actually an excuse for ignoring the right altogether.
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However, this course of conduct raises first amendment concerns
similar to those which the Supreme Court faced in Buckley v. Valeo. 162
In Buckley, various federal officeholders, candidates, political organizations, and potential contributors brought suit for declaratory and
injunctive relief against the enforcement of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971. 163 The plaintiffs argued that the Act's
limitations on both contributions and expenditures violated the first
amendment by abridging the freedoms of both expression and association. The Court agreed that both contributions and expenditures constituted speech rather than conduct. 164
However, the Court perceived that limitations on independent expenditures would produce consequences for political debate which
were very different from those produced by limitations on contributions, and it distinguished between these two kinds of speech on that
basis. 165 Because it concluded that the Act's "expenditure ceilings impose significantly more severe restrictions on protected freedoms of
political expression and association than do its limitations on financial
contributions," 166 the Court upheld the $1,000 limitation on contributions by any individual to any one candidate, 167 and struck down the
$1,000 limitation on independent expenditures by any individual "relative to a clearly identified candidate."168
While Buckley clarified first amendment limitations on congressional power to restrict contributions and expenditures in nonjudicial169 campaigns, it is not fully dispositive of the question of state
power to impose similar restrictions on contributions and expenditures
in judicial campaigns. However, the principles the Buckley Court
162. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
163. 424 U.S. at 8-9.
164. 424 U.S. at 16. This conclusion seems to have been closely related to the Court's observation that "virtually every means of communicating ideas in today's mass society requires expenditure of money." 424 U.S. at 19. But see Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money
Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001, 1011-12 (1976). Judge Wright disagrees with the Court's passive
acceptance of the "mass society's definitions of effectiveness" and argues that "face-to-face communication is more effective in a sense highly relevant to the First Amendment: it promotes real
interchange among citizens concerning the issues and candidates about which they must make a
choice." Id. Judge Wright also sharply criticizes Buckley's central premise that money is
speech.
165. 424 U.S. at 19-23. The Court opined that an expenditure limitation "necessarily
reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of
their exploration, and the size of the audience reached." 424 U.S. at 19 (footnote omitted). By
contrast, "a limitation upon the amount that any one person or group may contribute to a candidate or political committee entails only a marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to
engage in free communication." 424 U.S. at 20-21.
166. 424 U.S. at 23.
167. 424 U.S. at 24-29.
168. 424 U.S. at 39-51.
169. Buckley cannot provide direct authority as to judicial campaigns because the elections
regulated by the FECA were exclusively federal, which of course means nonjudicial.
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used to analyze each type of campaign regulation provide a framework
for scrutinizing such legislation under the first amendment.
1.

Campaign Contributions

Because the "transformation of contributions into political debate
involves speech by someone other than the contributor," 170 the Buckley Court believed that limitations on contributions implicated primarily the freedom of association rather than the freedom of speech. 171
The Court interpreted several of its rulings to stand for the proposition
that governmental interference with the freedom of association could
be sustained "if the State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest
and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of
associational freedoms." 172
Using this formula, the Court proceeded to weigh the congressional interests advanced in support of the PECA against the magnitude of the interference with first amendment rights. Having already
characterized the contributions ceilings as "marginal restriction[s]" 173
which "leave the contributor free to become a member of any political
association," 174 the Court found it "unnecessary to look beyond the
Act's primary purpose [of combatting the actuality and appearance of
corruption] in order to find a constitutionally sufficient justification for
the $1,000 contribution limitation." 175 The Court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that bribery laws and disclosure requirements constituted
less restrictive means of furthering this anticorruption purpose, 176 and
concluded that the contribution limitations passed muster under this
"rigorous standard of review." 111
Nothing in Buckley indicates that the Court relied on any congressional justifications not available to the states. 178 Indeed, the state
courts that have considered the constitutionality of state campaign
regulation since Buckley was decided have been unanimous in applying to their own statutes the same standards that the United States
170. 424 U.S. at 21.
171. 424 U.S. at 24-25.
172. 424 U.S. at 25.
173. 424 U.S. at 20.
174. 424 U.S. at 22.
175. 424 U.S. at 26. The government also claimed that the FECA equalized citizens' comparative abilities to affect election outcomes, and acted as a brake on skyrocketing campaign
costs. 424 U.S. at 26.
176. 424 U.S. at 27-28.
177. 424 U.S. at 29. For an attack upon the Court's extraordinary deference in this part of
the opinion, so uncharacteristic in the first amendment area, see Nicholson, Buckley v. Valeo:
The Constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, 1977 Wis. L.
REV. 323, 346-48.
178. On the contrary, the formulation of the balancing test employed by the Court was accompanied by citations to several cases challenging state action. See 424 U.S. at 25.
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Supreme Court applied in Buckley. 179 However, neither the United
States Supreme Court nor the state courts that have considered contri- ·
bution ceilings have defined the constitutional minima in the area of
contribution restrictions. 180 This is somewhat troublesome in the context of judicial elections, since they differ sufficiently from legislative
elections that due process concerns may be thought to arise from contributions of considerably less than $1,000. 181
However, these same differences between judicial and nonjudicial
elections increase the weight of the st~te's interest in campaign regulation, and justify special rules for judicial elections. First, judicial elections differ from legislative elections in that judges often run
unopposed, or with the endorsement of both major parties. 182 The upshot is that many candidates need very little in the way of campaign
funds - a phenomenon virtually unknown in United States Congressional races. Combined with the lower comparative cost of judicial
elections in general, the danger of any one contributor gaining undue
influence is therefore much greater in judicial elections. More fundamentally, it is in some sense legitimate for one who contributes to a
legislative campaign to expect the candidate to heed the contributor's
views more than those of a noncontributor. 183 Judges, on the other
hand, are expected to be impartial as between the parties. Any altera179. See, e.g., Partido Nuevo Progresista v. Hernandez Colon, 415 F. Supp. 475 (D.P.R.
1976); Schiller Park Colonial Inn v. Berz, 349 N.E.2d 61 (Ill. 1976); Advisory Opinion on Constitutionality of 1975 PA 227 (Questions 2-10), 242 N.W.2d 3 (Mich. 1976).
180. See Nicholson, supra note 177 at 347 n.105. Some language in the opinion suggests that
contributions may, consistently with the first amendment, be limited to considerably less than
$1,000 since contributing is merely an "undifferentiated, symbolic act." 424 U.S. at 21. The
Court also observed that the amount of any contribution can provide no more than "a very rough
index of the intensity of the contributor's support for the candidate" due in part to inequalities in
financial ability to contribute. See 424 U.S. at 21 & n.22.
However, the problem with interpreting Buckley to mean that symbolism is the primary value
implicated by restrictions on contributions is that such an interpretation seems inconsistent with
the Buckley Court's explicit rejection of the "symbolic speech" analysis announced in United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). See 424 U.S. at 15-17. This is part of a larger coherence
problem with the lengthy per curiam opinion in Buckley, which has been criticized as having "a
certain patchwork ... quality [that] seems to extend beyond style [to] an analytical inconsistency
[in] the Court's discussion of many of the substantive issues." Nicholson, supra note 177 at 325.
181. See note 183 infra.
182. Schotland, supra note 18, at 83-84.
183. Professor Schotland notes that contributions in nonjudicial campaigns usually dwarf
those in judicial campaigns, and asks,
What is it about those other races that attracts more dollars? To the extent that such races
draw funds aimed at "buying access," one is quite willing to accept lesser funding for judicial races; such contributions are clearly improper in judicial races. Can we safely assume
that judicial campaign contributions are selfless support for friends, for courts as institutions, or for judges especially worthy of retention? If we deem such an assumption realistic
about only some of the contributions to judicial candidates (or perhaps the assumption
reveals only that faith in tooth fairies is not limited to our children), aren't we implicitly
condemning the other dollars contributed to these campaigns? That is, whatever may be the
"right" level of funding for non-judicial races, almost any substantial funding in any judicial
race seems presumptively a matter for deep concern.
Schotland, supra note 18, at 112-13.
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tion of that balance toward one side or the other is a departure from
the fundamental ideal of Justice. To the extent that a state seeks to
protect the constitutional rights of litigants in its own fora, its interest
is accordingly more compelling than the anticorruption justification
which supported the statute challenged in Buckley. As Justice Stewart
has written, "There could hardly be a higher governmental interest
than a State's interest in the quality ofitsjudiciary." 184 Hence, a state
should have even greater power to protect its judiciary from the taint
of financial influence than it would have to police legislative races.
In summary, a state's interest in preserving the integrity of its judicial selection process is even stronger than the justifications for congressional action approved in Buckley, and should justify limitations
on contributions to state judicial campaigns even more restrictive than
the congressionally imposed ceiling of $1,000 upheld in Buckley.
However, the first amendment requirements surrounding the regulation of independent expenditures are more difficult to satisfy.
2.

Independent Expenditures

In stark contrast to the Supreme Court's characterization of contribution as an "undifferentiated, symbolic act" 185 is its assertion that
expenditure ceilings "limit political expression 'at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms.' " 186 Thus, while
only associational freedoms were impinged upon by contribution restrictions, the expenditure limitations squarely raised the right to freedom of expression. Against this weightier first amendment right, the
Court found none of the proffered governmental interests sufficient. 187
In order to avoid vagueness problems, the Court interpreted the
statutory limitation on expenditures "relative to a clearly identifiable
candidate" to encompass only those "expenditures for communications that in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly
identified candidate for federal office.'' 188 Having done so, the Court
unsurprisingly found it to be insufficiently related to the problem of
corruption, since the narrow construction made it easy to circumvent
the statute. 189 The Court also noted that independent expenditures do
184. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 848 (1978) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
185. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.
186. 424 U.S. at 39 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968)). This difference in
the way the Court characterized the two rights at stake reflects its earlier conclusion that a
limitation on expenditures constituted a direct restraint which "necessarily reduces the quantity
of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the
size of the audience reached." 424 U.S. at 19 (footnote omitted).
187. 424 U.S. at 51.
188. 424 U.S. at 41-44 (footnote omitted).
189. For instance, an advertisement could promote the candidate and his views without ex·
pressly advocating his election or his opponent's defeat. See 424 U.S. at 45.
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not present the same degree of danger of corruption as large campaign
contributions. 19° Finally, the Court rejected the government's "ancillary" interest in equalizing political influence, calling "the concept
that government may restrict the speech of some elements in our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others ... wholly foreign
to the First Amendment."191
State and lower federal courts have followed Buckley to invalidate
state restrictions on independent spending as uniformly as they have
upheld contribution ceilings. 192 Absent some special state interest of
more gravity than those that the Court found insufficient in Buckley, it
seems unlikely that a state could constitutionally regulate independent
political expenditures. Fortunately, however, the due process rights of
litigants can be protected without such limitations: if the states may
constitutionally limit campaign contributions, then the only threat to
the impartiality of state elective judges will be from independent expenditures, and the incidence of such expenditures is surely slight. 193
As a result, recusal will be a manageable solution to the problem of
possible judicial bias.194
Furthermore, there are three reasons why it seems implausible to
expect that imposing a ceiling on contributions will result in any appreciable rise in the independent expenditures attorneys undertake on
behalf of judges. First, judges are sensitive to the appearance of impropriety, and many indicate that they take contributions from attor190. 424 U.S. at 47:
Unlike contributions, such independent expenditures may well provide little assistance to
the candidate's campaign and indeed may prove counterproductive. The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his agent not only
undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates the danger that
expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.
Compare the Court's earlier statement that banning contributions would hav~ no adverse effect
upon funding because it would merely "compel people who would otherwise contribute amounts
greater than the statutory limits to expend such funds on direct political expression." 424 U.S. at
22.
191. 424 U.S. at 48-49.
192. See, e.g., Bang v. Chase, 442 F. Supp. 758 (D. Minn. 1977), ajfd. mem., 436 U.S. 941
(1978); Hardie v. Fong Eu, 18 Cal. 3d 371, 556 P.2d 301, 134 Cal Rptr. 201 (1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 969 (1977); Citizens for Jobs and Energy v. Fair Political Practices Commn., 16 Cal. 3d
671, 547 P.2d 1386, 129 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1976); Labor's Educational and Political Club - Indep.
v. Danforth, 561 S.W.2d 339 (Mo. 1977).
193. Indeed, the increasing significance of political action committees since Buckley might be
seen as the logical response to the difficulty of making an effective independent political expenditure on one's own.
194. Regardless of the fecundity of any distinction between judicial and nonjudicial elections
in assessing the relevant state interest in regulating expenditures, cf notes 147-50 supra and
accompanying text, the viability of recusal (when used in conjunction with campaign contribution limitations) as a way to advance the state's interest in the administration of justice in its
courts makes any attempt to avoid the Buckley prohibition on expenditure ceilings less likely to
succeed, due to the "least restrictive means" aspect of the Court's analysis. See text accompanying note 172 supra.
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neys reluctantly. 195 An independent political expenditure of a
magnitude sufficient to attract the judge's attention is likely to attract
the attention of others as well, and the increased scrutiny and aura of
impropriety may well be most unwelcome. 196 Second, anecdotal accounts of why lawyers contribute indicate that they simply want to be
"on record" as having made a show of support. 197 However, the cost
of any meaningful independent expenditure may very well exceed
what most lawyers are willing to pay to gratify this desire. 19 8
But probably more important than either of these reasons is the
self-fulfilling nature of a rule requiring judicial recusal whenever one
of the attorneys has made an independent expenditure on behalf of the
judge. If an attorney knows that the consequence of spending abnormal amounts of money on a judicial candidate will be that candidate's
disqualification from any case in which the attorney appears, then he
will have little reason to believe that making the expenditure will benefit him or his clients. The level of independent expenditures on behalf
of judicial candidates can therefore be expected to continue to reflect
honest enthusiasm for the candidate, rather than the illegitimate desire
to avoid campaign restrictions.
To be sure, prohibiting campaign contributions from lawyers raises
other problems; and although they are problems of public policy
rather than of constitutionality, they are nonetheless serious. One
concern is that if the amount of funding supplied by lawyers is restricted by statute, it is reasonable to expect that total contributions
will decline, since lawyers account for so much of the total amount
contributed. 199 This might lead to less discussion of the issues in judicial campaigns;200 or worse, increase the importance of a candidate's
personal wealth. 201 To offset this problem, states might try to institute
195. See, e.g., Schotland, supra note 18, at 160, 162; Ethical Dilemma, supra note 17, at 397·
403.
196. Cf. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47, where the Court observed that independent, uncoordinated
political expenditures may be counterproductive. It is important to remember in this connection
that independent expenditures, unlike campaign contributions, are made in a way calculated to
attract as much public attention as possible.
197. See text accompanying notes 114-19, 144-46 supra.
198. The Buckley Court was impressed by the finding in the record that "as of January I,
1975, one full-page advertisement in a daily edition of a certain metropolitan newspaper cost
$6,971.04." 424 U.S. at 20 n.20. This sum is by no means prohibitive, as all too many anecdotal
accounts suggest. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 126-27 supra. It is important to remember,
however, that campaign regulation need not prevent all political improprieties in order to protect
the right to an impartial forum. To be successful, regulation need only reduce the frequency of
improper support to the level at which recusal becomes a manageable solution.
199. See notes 6 & 124 supra.
200. Anyone familiar with the standard fare in judicial campaigns may certainly wonder how
deleterious fewer repetitions of it would be. There are so many outrageous anecdotes, ranging
from the merely irrelevant through the unseemly to the downright misleading, that it would be
impossible to do them justice in this Note. For just a smattering, interested readers should con·
suit Forum, The Robed Politician, L.A. LAW., Mar. 1979, at 12.
201. See Ethical Dilemma, supra note 17, at 398-99.
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a system of public funding by which qualified candidates would receive financial assistance in return for a promise not to accept contributions from lawyers or their firms. 202
A second problem with strict regulation of lawyer contributions J.s
the possibility that the "funding gap" they leave might be filled by
"[s]pecial interest groups [who] are less qualified than attorneys to assess the professional competence of the candidates, and [who] may
care less about competence."203 Two separate dangers arise here. The
first is that lawyers and law firms might reconstitute themselves as
political action committees (PACs) for the purpose of circumventing
the statutory limitations on lawyer contributions or the constitutional
rule of disqualification that would normally result from an independent expenditure by a lawyer. 204 With respect to contributions, competent draftsmanship should be able to solve the problem by limiting
contributions from PACs that are dominated by lawyers in terms of
administration, membership, or funding. As for independent expenditures, courts could subject lawyer PACs to the same constitutional
rule of disqualification that applies to the lawyers themselves. 205
A more serious danger is raised by ostensibly nonlawyer PACs that
nonetheless have a real stake in the overall predisposition of the bench.
A group of insurance companies, for instance, might engage in extensive independent expenditures on behalf of judicial candidates who
202. Some local bar associations have tried this approach on a voluntary basis. For instance,
the Bar Association of Greater Cleveland adopted a plan in 1974 which requires any candidate
seeking the Bar Association's endorsement to agree "not [to] solicit or accept funds, directly or
indirectly, from or through any individual attorney or any member of his immediate family, or
from or through any law firm practicing in Cuyahoga County, Ohio." Agreement of Candidate
Seeking Bar's Endorsement, 45 CLEVELAND B.J. 157, 157 (1974). The candidate must also
pledge not to allow any attorney to serve on his campaign committee, and to recuse himself in
any case in which a member of his campaign committee is a party unless, after full disclosure of
the relationship, the consent of all parties to the action has been obtained. Id.
The Cleveland plan has generally worked very well; however, the Cleveland plan and similar
plans in Dade County, Florida, and Wayne County, Michigan, have been beset by the fact that
federal and state officials charged with enforcing the applicable tax and disclosure laws have been
unwilling to treat the resulting judicial campaign funds any differently than they would treat
funds dispersed by a typical political action committee. These difficulties eventually led to the
death of the Dade County and Wayne County plans. See Schotland, supra note 18, at 96-107.
State legislation providing for a publicly financed version of these programs would enjoy distinct
advantages in this respect.
203. Baum, supra note 119, at 258.
204. See text accompanying notes 192-94 supra.
205. Note that disqualification in this situation would not depend upon theories of alter ego
or "controlling person" liability such as those familiar to corporations law or securities regulation. Instead, it would be a straightforward application of the analysis developed in Part II.C. If
a particular PAC's contribution to ajudge, and a particular attorney's influence within the PAC,
were significant enough that a decision in favor of the party represented by the PAC attorney
would substantially advance that judge's chance of reelection, or create a possible temptation for
the judge to favor one litigant, then the attorney affiliated with the PAC should be disqualified.
The question of how closely the attorney and the PAC are affiliated is relevant only to the extent
that it bears on whether the judge's gratitude to or dependence on the PAC might manifest itself
in bias toward the attorney.
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have generally been more demanding of plaintiffs in personal injury
cases. Or, the American Medical Association might support judges
who are more exacting in malpractice cases. 206 This danger is real, but
it is not a danger of favoritism toward a particular litigant; instead it is
a matter of the overall character of the bench. As such, it would seem
to be one of the incidents of having an elective system at all rather
than a malady peculiar to limitations on lawyer contributions.
In summary, the best way for a state to protect its citizens from the
due process violations occasioned by extraordinary judicial campaign
contributions may be to prevent those contributions from becoming
"extraordinary" in the first place. This it may do, consistently with the
first amendment, by limiting contributions to judicial campaigns. It is
probably constitutionally impermissible to regulate independent political expenditures, but these expenditures are likely to be of such slight
incidence that mandatory recusal in such cases is feasible.
CONCLUSION

This Note has argued that the constitutional right to an impartial
forum should protect individuals from judicial bias that results from
an attorney's campaign contributions. Whenever such contributions
are large enough that a decision in the contributor's favor would substantially advance a judge's chance of reelection, or whenever such
contributions otherwise create a possible temptation to decide one way
or the other, this important constitutional right is violated. The adversely affected litigant should be granted a new trial with a new
judge. However, the magnitude of the problem may be so great that
recusal alone will not suffice to cure the constitutional infirmity.
States may need to regulate lawyer contributions more strictly in order
to fully protect the individual's right to due process.
In the end, it may be that the best way to preserve the impartiality
of elected judges is not to elect them. The Constitution does not specify how judges are to be selected in the various states. It does, however, specify that individuals are not to be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law. And impartiality is the very
heart of due process. As one judge has stated,
A legislator or executive may to some extent represent special interests
to whom he owes his election. To be sure, he should not put those interests ahead of the general welfare, but no one expects him to be impartial.
A judge, however, who is not impartial is nothing. Worse, he is an oppression; only because of her blindfold is the goddess of justice given a
sword. 207

If the states are to demonstrate that they take the constitutional right
206. These PACs would not themselves be litigants, and so could not be treated as "institutional litigants" on the theory described in note 85 supra.
207. Spaeth, Reflections on a Judicial Campaign, 60 JUDICATURE 10, 14 (1976).
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to an impartial forum seriously, then they must reform their judicial
selection processes to eliminate the political bias that now creeps into
the system in the vast majority of states, and runs rampant in some. If
this can be done within an elective system, then the state is perfectly
free to choose that method. Whatever other arguments there are
against such a system, nothing in the Constitution prohibits it per se.
However, if an elective system can only be instituted at the expense
of individual rights of due process, then the Supreme Court must be
ready to take its own pronouncements about procedural fairness seriously, and to strike down such systems. The primacy of the constitutional rights of the individual in our constitutional scheme demands
no less.
-

Mark Andrew Grannis

